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Abstract 
On August 12, 1676, Benjamin Church, an English colonizer and military leader, 
led a company of Englishmen and Indian allies in an attack on a group of Wampanoags 
with the goal of killing the Wampanoag sachem known as Metacomet, Metacom, or King 
Philip. According to colonial records, the attack took place at Mount Hope in Bristol, 
Rhode Island during King Philip’s War. This conflict began in southern Massachusetts in 
June 1675 and eventually engulfed most of New England. The Wampanoags and English 
fought on opposing sides. 
This study will analyze the attack that resulted in Philip’s death, guided by the 
question: How did the colonial forces, with their Indian allies, defeat the group of 
Wampanoags they fell upon? The major argument that underlies this study is that Indian 
war tactics- adopted by the English in the final and fatal attack on Philip, rather than a 
disparity in weaponry between the two sides- helped assure the military victory. The 
relative equity in military hardware supports the assertion that the use of Indian war 
tactics was more influential than advanced weaponry in determining battle victories. 
Investigation of these questions is difficult due to a lack of Native American 
written accounts of the attack. The problem is partially remedied using archaeological 
evidence. The colonial weapons buried with Native Americans at a seventeenth-century 
Wampanoag burial ground suggests a level of value attributed to them, and supports 
historic accounts of the Indians' use of colonial weapons during King Philip's War. This 
study will also examine how King Philip's War, specifically the attack which resulted in 
Philip's death, is remembered today and how the conflict fits into the broader history of 
colonial Rhode Island.  
Chapter One introduces the study. Chapter Two details what historians and 
researchers have argued about the reasons for colonial victory. Chapter Three is a cultural 
comparison of weapons and war tactics between the English and Native Americans. It 
will demonstrate that Native Americans adopted and mastered European weapons, which 
helped level the wartime playing field and narrowed military discrepancies. This in turn 
suggests that other factors- such as the adoption of Native American war tactics- more 
heavily contributed to battle victories. Chapter Four focuses on archaeology; it details the 
archaeological study of Burr’s Hill, a seventeenth-century Wampanoag burial ground. 
Chapter Five analyzes the final attack on Philip using historical and archaeological 
evidence and demonstrates the use of Native American military tactics by the English 
colonists and their Native American allies; it also explains the archaeological significance 
of the site where Philip allegedly fell. Chapter Six discusses how the attack and the 
overall war is remembered in Rhode Island with writings, monuments and events. 
Chapter Seven is the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Mayflower departed England and made way for the New World in 1620.1 She 
carried 102 English passengers considered to be Separatists, the people on the very fringe 
of the Puritan movement. Puritans rejected the Church of England and desired to purge 
the church of all unnecessary rituals and expenses; they desired simpler lives.2 As people 
who had resolved to draw away from the Church of England rather than working for a 
change within the established church, they were considered radicals.3  
Massasoit, the Wampanoag leader, greeted the pilgrims in 1621.4 Fifty- four years 
later his son Metacom would go to war against the English. It’s not entirely clear why or 
how the war started when it did, but once it began it was virtually merciless.5 The 
Wampanoags, Narragansetts, Nipmucks, Pocomtucks and Abenakis attacked and burned 
English towns and slaughtered its inhabitants; the English, with occasional aid from 
Mohegans, Pequots, Mohawks and Christian Indians, burned, murdered and sold 
prisoners into slavery.6 Jill Lepore, professor of American history at Harvard University, 
argues that “both sides practiced torture, and mutilation of the dead.”7 Ultimately, the 
English colonists were victorious. 
                                                           
1 Nathaniel Philbrick, Mayflower: A Story of Courage, Community, and War (New York: Viking, 2006), xiv. 
2 Bert Lippincott, reference librarian and genealogist at the Newport Historical Society, telephone 
interview by author, Oct. 20, 2018. 
3 Philbrick, 4. 
4 Ibid., xiv. 
5 Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity, (New York: Vintage, 
1999), 7. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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There were a number of factors which led to the colonial victory in King Philip's 
War. Writers, historians and researchers have allotted varying amounts of weight to these 
factors. Some Englishmen who wrote during and immediately after the war attributed the 
colonial victory to God. Some contemporary historians and researchers argue for the 
English superiority in weapons; while others more heavily attribute the colonists’ success 
on their adoption and successful execution of Indian war tactics.  
The colonial and Indian forces both had sufficient arsenals. There is evidence that 
Indians readily adopted colonial guns and used them to supplement their aboriginal 
arsenal. Whatever benefits the guns offered, the Indians reaped; they grew skilled and 
efficient in their use. Firearms, especially flintlock muskets, were an excellent addition to 
their forest warfare. Their possession of guns coupled with their knowledge of the land 
and hunting skills made the Indians a particularly strong threat. Yet the colonists 
ultimately won the war. With a sufficient arsenal and acute forest warfare skills, why did 
the Indians lose King Philip's War? For most of the Indians, defeat translated to 
enslavement following the war, seizure of their land and colonial control of the historical 
narrative.  
Historians have highlighted the various factors that contributed to the colonial 
victory in King Philip's War. I argue that Indian-style war tactics adopted by the English 
more heavily contributed to the colonial victory, more so than a wide discrepancy in 
weapons between the two sides. This is because both the Indians and English were 
relatively even-handed when it came to their arsenals. In the final and fatal attack on 
Philip, Benjamin Church and his soldiers used the Indian-style war tactic of ambush to 
target and kill Philip and capture his band of followers. The war waned and ended shortly 
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thereafter. I combine historical, archaeological and cultural landscape evidence to provide 
a more holistic examination of the importance of military tactics in King Philip's War and 
how the war is remembered today. 
A Note on Names 
 I use words like English, Indian, Native American, colonist, native inhabitant and 
indigenous people to identify and describe the seventeenth-century people I analyzed in 
this study. Indian was a hard word to settle on; since the word is coined by the English it 
felt less authentic and more offensive, but it is the word used by many scholars of 
American history. Plus, it’s a word employed by some descendants of indigenous people 
in Rhode Island today.8 Colonist, native inhabitant and indigenous people felt appropriate 
and sensitive. But identity, really, is too complex for words. Christine DeLucia, an 
associate professor of history at Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts, 
who researches and teaches early American history and indigenous studies with a focus 
on race, ethnicity and colonialism, wrote in “The Memory Frontier” of the Sacred Run 
and Paddle, a commemorative event on October 30, 2010. The event commemorated the 
forced removal of Nipmuc and other Eastern Algonquian peoples from their homes to 
Deer Island in Boston Harbor, where they were confined during the winter of 1675–1676. 
At the event, “not one participant identified foremost as Indian,” Christine DeLucia 
wrote. “They called themselves Nipmuc, Wampanoag (Mashpee or Aquinnah), 
Ponkapoag, Abenaki, Penobscot.”9 Whenever possible, the Native Americans referred to 
in this text will be allotted their tribal affiliations, but when specific identification is not 
                                                           
8 Narragansett Indian Tribe, “The Narragansett Indian Tribe,” Narragansett Indian Tribe, accessed 
November 20, 2018, NarragansettIndianNation.org. 
9 Christine DeLucia, “The Memory Frontier: Uncommon Pursuits of Past and Place in the Northeast after 
King Philip’s War,” The Journal of American History 98 (March 2012): 977. 
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possible, the words Indian or Native American will be used. These words aren’t perfect, 
but many words fail to encapsulate the complexities and nuances of a person or a people. 
DeLucia wrote: “In the realm of lived experience there has rarely been a coherent 
American identity, and certainly not a monolithic Indian one, but instead finer-grained 
levels of loyalty and comprehension where memories are plural and shifting.”10   
Wampanoag can be thought of as designating a united political group of territorial 
village units, bounded on the west by Narragansett Bay and the Pawtuxet River; to the 
east was the Atlantic Ocean. The Wampanoag included the inhabitants of Martha's 
Vineyard, Nantucket, and Aquidneck Island.11 There were nine territorial subdivisions 
which comprised the federation of Wampanoag, the leading division being Pokanoket, 
home of the supreme sachem, Massasoit (otherwise known as Ousamequin).12 Out of all 
the New England aboriginal tribes in the seventeenth century, this study focuses on the 
Wampanoags. 
It is hard to limit war and its effects on the people who experienced it in words. 
Even the labeling of the events that are here discussed as “King Philip's War” is 
problematic. Some argue the conflict be called a “Puritan Conquest” while others 
champion the name “Metacom's Rebellion,” insisting Philip is more accurately referred 
to by his Algonquian name, Metacom (also rendered “Metacomet” or “Pometacom”); 
others insist the seventeenth-century events be referred to as an Indian civil war.13 Jill 
Lepore argues that all wars have at least two names; what most Americans call the “Civil 
                                                           
10 Ibid. 
11 Christina B. Johannsen, , “European Trade Goods and Wampanoag Culture in the Seventeenth Century,” 
in Burr’s Hill, a 17th Century Wampanoag burial ground in Warren, Rhode Island, ed. Susan Gibson, Studies 
in anthropology and material culture (Providence, Rhode Island: Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology, 
Brown University, 1980), 25. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Lepore, xv. 
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War” has been called by northerners “The War of the Rebellion” and by southerners the 
“War of Northern Aggression.” Lepore argues that “names of wars are always biased; 
they always privilege one perspective over another.”14  
My words are flawed, but most are. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
14 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Different centuries yield different writers and different trends regarding the 
descriptions of events. Though an entire group of people and their complex emotions and 
thoughts can't be discerned wholly and accurately from the writings of only a certain 
number of them, written records grant glimpses into the mentalities of individuals, who 
are, at least partially, products of their environment.  
The colonial-era scribes argued that the violent confrontations in King Philip’s 
War were won or lost due to divine will. As the years progressed, writers emerged who 
had not experienced the war first-hand but heard and read narratives. These writers 
examined the war through a difference cultural lens and offered evaluations only possible 
with hindsight. Nineteenth century writers did not attribute the colonial victory so heavily 
to divine intervention; they outlined other reasons for the Indian defeat, like the adoption 
of aboriginal military techniques by the colonists and their recruitment of Native 
American soldiers. Arguments defining either weapon sophistication or military tactics as 
the most definitive variables in wartime victories are popular among twenty and twenty-
first century writers, but the twenty and twenty-first century historiographies are even 
more varied than previous centuries. This chapter will examine how writers in different 
centuries interpreted the war, starting with the earliest writers in the seventeenth century. 
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Interpretations of the war by seventeenth-century writers 
 More than four hundred letters written during the war survive in New England 
archives alone; there are more than thirty editions of twenty different printed accounts. 
Though the early historiography of the war is extensive, no one narrative emerged among 
the seventeenth-century writers of King Philip’s War.15 The historiography of the war 
began immediately after the war ended, before the trials concluded and the enslavement 
and death sentences to the indigenous people were carried out. Why did the colonists 
write about their experiences and their thoughts and feelings, and why were their 
accounts published so quickly? 
In part, writing serves as an organizational tool for human thoughts; it’s a method 
of understanding and explaining events that are difficult to reconcile, such as war. Words, 
definitions and explanations make life- a seemingly limitless phenomenon- more limited. 
Writing serves as an organizational outlet for the thoughts that seemingly have no end or 
limits in the human mind or in oral communication; writing requires the production of 
tangible evidence, and tangible evidence for the colonists meant something concrete for 
them to hold onto in the midst of such chaos. In part, the act of transcribing their 
experiences helped the colonists on individual levels make sense of what happened. 
Defining and transcribing King Philip’s War also allowed the colonists to gain control of 
the historical narrative. The written records coupled with the extermination or 
enslavement of the indigenous people encouraged later generations to rely heavily on 
colonial accounts to piece together and understand what created, sustained and ended the 
conflict known as King Philip’s War. 
                                                           
15 Lepore, Ch. 2. 
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Increase Mather was not a soldier in King Philip’s War, but he was an associate of 
most of the colonial leadership and was considered a spiritual advisor to the war effort.16 
Mather’s A Brief History of the Warr was first published in Boston in 1676.17 Mather 
writes that he pulled from his diary entries to put A Brief History together; diary entries 
that he penned in the midst of the conflict. His history documents events through 1676 
(hostilities in southern, central and western New England ended that year, though fighting 
continued in areas of Maine until 1678).18 Mather claims he wrote the history in the first 
place because two other accounts of the war were mistaken; he acts the part of the 
righteous historian, claiming to provide an accurate and un-biased history for readers.19 
Mather writes that King Philip’s War happened because the colonists failed to 
please God. He calls the sins of the colonists ripe; they deserved so “dreadfull a 
judgment” as a war.20 The war happened because the next “Generation” did not doggedly 
pursue “the blessed design of their Fathers, in following the Lord into this Wilderness.”21 
He reasons that certain events happened because of divine intervention. Mather details 
the tragic tale of John Sausaman, an Indian who apparently betrayed Philip and confided 
in the English in 1674. Sausaman was subsequently murdered and three Indians were 
found guilty for his death. Mather writes: “No doubt but one reason why the Indians 
murdered John Sassamon, was out of hatred against him for his Religion, for he was 
                                                           
16 Increase Mather, A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England (1676): An Online 
Electronic Text Edition, ed. Paul Royster (Faculty Publications, UNL Libraries), 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/31, abstract. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 3. 
20 Ibid., 10. 
21 Ibid. Whenever possible the original spellings and capitalizations will be maintained when referencing 
colonial accounts, but sometimes modern grammatical tweaks will be made for the sake of clarity and 
flow. 
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Christianized and baptiz’d, and was a Preacher amongst the Indians.”22 Mather argues 
John Sassamon was victimized for his love of God, and this prejudice among the Indian 
enemies towards the English faith sparked violence and the onset of the war; he 
effectively creates sympathy for the English, absolves them of guilt and paints the 
colonists as sympathetic to the Indians who chose to be Christianized.   
In one particular instance early in the war, the English tracked King Philip but 
abandoned the chase. Mather argues that if the pursuit continued, Philip would have been 
captured and the war would have ended, “but though Deliverance was according to all 
Humane probability near, God saw it not good for us as yet.”23 Whether right or wrong, 
Mather considers the unfolding of events in the New World as pre-destined and entirely 
controlled by God; it’s not the fault of the colonists that the war dragged on and the 
violence wasn’t immediately snuffed. Mather had faith that despite any instance of 
oppression or sorrow “our God will have compassion on us, and this his People shall not 
utterly perish.”24 Mather reasons that the war dragged on so God could effectively crush 
the soul of King Philip: “Thus hath God brought that grand Enemy into great misery 
before he quite destroy him. It must needs be bitter as death to him, to [lose] his Wife and 
only Son…and almost all his Subjects and Country too.”25 Mather writes that “God 
brought it to pass, chiefly by Indians themselves” when one of Philip’s men fled for 
Rhode Island and informed the English that Philip had “returned again to Mount-Hope, 
and undertook to bring them to the Swamp where he hid himself.”26 “Divine Providence” 
guaranteed that Capt. Church was in Rhode Island to receive the intelligence which 
                                                           
22 Mather, 11. 
23 Ibid., 15. 
24 Ibid., 17. 
25 Ibid., 69. 
26 Ibid., 71. 
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allowed the Wampanoag sachem to be destroyed, and the war to finally end.27 Mather 
claims the “Gospel was freely offered to him, [King Philip] and to his Subjects, but they 
despised it.”28 Mather asserts that the war could have been prevented had God been 
pleased; the English tried to save the Indians, but they would not listen and so God 
passed judgment.29 Mather touts God as the ultimate variable in the colonial victory. He 
calls the aboriginal arsenal, specifically bows and arrows, woefully inefficient compared 
to the “lethality” of English guns and swords. But eventually the Indians acquired English 
firearms; Mather calls the Native Americans “unhappily furnished” with the English 
weapons.30 He notes that the acquisition of European weapons put the Indians on an 
equal plane with the colonists in terms of killing technology, but Mather asserts weapons 
are pawns to God. The Indians lost the war because “the terror of God was upon them.”31  
Born in 1639 to a Plymouth carpenter, Benjamin Church was raised to take up his 
father’s trade. But when King Philip’s War erupted in 1675, Church joined the colonial 
forces as a volunteer officer. He rose in rank and prominence in the Puritan military; his 
use of military tactics which were considered unorthodox and largely adapted from 
Algonquian influences distinguished him from other puritan leaders. And it was Church 
who, as a military captain, was commissioned by Gov. Josiah Winslow to descend upon 
Philip and his followers in the final and fatal attack on the Wampanoag sachem on 
August 12, 1675.32   
                                                           
27 Ibid., 71-73. 
28 Mather, 89. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid, 10. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Benjamin Church and Thomas Church, The Entertaining History of King Philip’s War (Early American 
Imprints, Series 1, no. 12352), https://infoweb-newsbank-com.uri.idm.oclc.org, 30-31; Philip Gould, 
“Reinventing Benjamin Church: Virtue, Citizenship and the History of King Philip’s War in Early National 
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 The Entertaining History of King Philip’s War was composed by Church’s son, 
Thomas; Thomas Church transcribed his father’s oral recollections and copied his 
wartime diaries to create the narrative.33 In the introduction to the narrative, Church 
credits his survival in the war to the “over-ruling hand of the Almighty… I endeavored to 
put all my confidence in him, and by his almighty power was carried through every 
difficult action.”34 Like Mather, Church attributes all events and outcomes to the will of 
God; human choice seems to matter little, since the colonists are essentially acting as 
vessels for God’s work and will. This mentality dually helps to absolve the English of 
guilt and comfort them, what transpired was no fault of their own but the will of God. 
The war was inevitable.  
Philip Gould argues that the principal motifs of An Entertaining History are 
Church’s heroism and his success in adapting an unorthodox style of military tactics to 
seal the Puritan victory.35 Gould writes: “As a tale of military (mis)adventure, its largely 
secular appeal- despite its intermittent recourse to the guiding hand of divine Providence- 
distinguishes it from official histories of the war” like Mather’s history and William 
Hubbard’s  A Narrative of the Trouble with the Indians in New-England.36 Church exudes 
confidence in his military decisions and touts his own innovation and tactical genius. 
Even the title of Church’s narrative- an “entertaining” history- alludes to the ensuing 
content.  The tone of his narrative is more adventurous and fantastical than it is somber 
                                                                                                                                                                             
America,” Journal of the Early Republic 16, no. 4 (1996): 646, http://www-jstor-
org.uri.idm.oclc.org/stable/3124421. 
33 Gould, 647. 
34 Church et al., iv. 
35 Gould, 647. 
36 Ibid. 
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and a means of post-wartime reconciliation. Church credits God, but he also credits his 
military prowess for the colonial victory. 
William Hubbard, an orthodox Puritan minister, first published A Narrative in 
1676. Like Mather and Church, Hubbard credits God for the colonial victory on August 
12, 1676 in Rhode Island. He also credits Church, though Church was acting as a vessel 
of God’s will.37 He calls Captain Church’s leadership a “great advantage” in wartime 
victories for the colonial forces.38 When Hubbard describes the final and fatal attack on 
Philip, he said the Wampanoag sachem was “hunted by the English Forces through the 
Woods” until at least “driven to his own Den.”39 Philip and his followers were 
surrounded; the swamp they had retreated to “provided but a Prison…till the Messengers 
of death, came by Divine permission to execute vengeance upon him.”40 Hubbard asserts 
that it was the aggressive and tactical pursuit- military genius- that sealed King Philip’s 
fate. Hubbard, in his re-telling of the final and fatal attack, doesn’t focus on the hardware 
but on the ambush tactic and allots more weight to that factor than weaponry in 
determining the colonial victory. Like other seventeenth-century writers, Hubbard 
advances that God is always a pivotal factor in victories, defeats and all other life events.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
37 William Hubbard, A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New-England (1677) (Early American 
Imprints, Series 1, no. 231), https://infoweb-newsbank-com.uri.idm.oclc.org, 104. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 103. 
40 Ibid. 
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Interpretations of the war by nineteenth-century writers 
The colonial revival was a late nineteenth-century movement that encouraged 
interest in America's colonial heritage, especially on the East Coast; it tended to foster a 
sanitized view of the past “that seemed reassuring and morally sound in an era of rapid 
social transformation.”41 Zachariah Allen (1795-1882), the president of the Rhode Island 
Historical Society when it was founded in 1822, and speaker and writer on historical 
topics, “was a principal architect of public memory during the state's colonial revival.”42 
Born in Providence and educated at Brown University, Allen built his fortune through 
textile enterprises, yet he remained a devoted champion and advocate for the past.43 Allen 
paid homage to the grave site of Benjamin Church in Little Compton and personally 
funded renovations for the crumbling grave stone.44 The grassroots efforts in the 
centuries proceeding the end of King Philip's War and before the twentieth century to 
memorialize the New England landscape was a legacy of Allen's. In a speech given by 
Allen before the Rhode Island Historical Society in 1876, the bi-centennial anniversary of 
the war, Allen highlights the importance of a cultural landscape in preserving the memory 
of a person or group of people. Narragansett Bay “will forever remain a memorial of their 
[the Narragansetts] existence,” Allen wrote.45 He describes a region called “Massasoit's 
country,” which evolved into “Massachusetts.”46 “If fame can be an offset to wrongs,” 
Allen stated, “this old chief is remunerated by affixing his name to one of the present 
                                                           
41 DeLucia, 982. 
42 Ibid. 
43 DeLucia, 982.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Zachariah Allen, Bi-centenary of the Burning of Providence in 1676: Defence of the Rhode Island System 
of Treatment of the Indians, and of Civil and Religious Liberty. An Address Delivered before the Rhode 
Island Historical Society, April 10th, 1876 (Providence Press, 1876), 4. 
46 Ibid., 5. 
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United States of America.”47 But fame cannot offset wrongs, heal hearts or repair what 
was done to the people who inhabited the land before the English colonizers claimed it. 
Allen hoped that it might; that bloodshed and lands taken could be reconciled with the 
English naming of the stolen land. Citing Connecticut poet L.H. Sigourney, Allen stated 
“the red men will never be forgotten, while so many of our States, bays, lakes and rivers, 
are indelibly stamped with their names.”48 From a contemporary point of view, we know 
this to be false; names can survive the test of time but their origins and meanings can be 
forgotten and their significance diminished. Allen argued that “to be remembered and 
honored in after ages is the object of human ambition.”49 He recognized the individual 
actors in King Philip’s War, both Indian and English, and tried to honor them in the 
physical landscape. He states in his address to the Rhode Island Historical Society that 
“the fate of a nation depends on the conduct of a few leaders.”50 Allen attributed outcome 
more on individual, personal choices- specifically the choices of military leaders- rather 
than God, a seventeenth-century trend.  
Like Allen, George Bodge valued the fighters in King Philip’s War. Bodge 
focused on military veterans in his analysis of the conflict; he released his first edition of 
Soldiers in King Philip's War in 1892. His work was an effort to shed light on forgotten 
colonial military heroes who fought in King Philip's War. He identified soldiers, military 
committees and scouts in his lists of men who served the English cause.51 At a eulogy for 
Philip at the Odeon in Boston in 1836, Indian Rev. William Apess (also spelled “Apes”) 
called Philip a martyr and one who will be remembered by his descendants. Though his 
                                                           
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 33. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Allen, 23. 
51 George Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip’s War (Printed for the author, 1896). 
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fight was unsuccessful, King Philip’s War was “as glorious as the American 
Revolution”52 and he described Philip as “the greatest man that ever lived upon the 
American shores.”53 Like Bodge, Apess highlighted the importance of main actors- 
people in leadership roles or prominent positions- in determining the outcomes of violent 
encounters. Apess said Philip would have been victorious “had it not been for Indians 
who were hired to fight against other Indians…though they [the pilgrims]54 must 
acknowledge, that without the aid of Indians and their guides, they must inevitably have 
been swept off.”55 The pilgrims, also, deceived the Indians “as their word has never been 
fulfilled in regard to Indian rights” and it was through deception “that the pilgrims gained 
the country.”56 Apess asserted that the English were only victorious because they 
recruited Indian soldiers and used Indian military intelligence, and they secured these 
resources by promising the Indians land and life after the war, which they failed to give 
them. 
Interpretations of the war by twenty and twenty-first century writers 
Many twenty and twenty-first century researchers acknowledge the power of 
written accounts, military leaders, military strategies, and technology in their analyses of 
factors that contributed to the colonial victory. The hallmark of the King Philip's War 
historiography in the twenty and twenty-first centuries is its depth and nuances compared 
to previous centuries. There’s acknowledgement that King Philip’s War was complex and 
the reasons for colonial victory multi-faceted.  
                                                           
52 William Apess, Euology on King Philip, As Pronounced at the Odeon in Federal Street, Boston, by the Rev. 
William Apes, an Indian (Gale, 2012), 6. 
53 Ibid., 26. 
54 Brackets my own. 
55 Apess, 38. 
56 Ibid. 
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Modern, general studies of Rhode Island history offer various interpretations of 
King Philip's War. In Colonial Rhode Island: A History, Sydney V. James argues that the 
English colonists' hunger for land sparked the conflict.57 James argues that the English 
colonial victory in the attack on Philip was significantly aided by a divided Native 
American population, which echoes Apess; the Narragansetts attempted to find comrades 
in the Sakonnet branch of the Wampanoags only to find that they had allied with the 
English colonists. Eventually, “the Indian peoples who lived around Narragansett Bay 
were...exterminating each other.”58 William G. McLoughlin in Rhode Island: A History 
offers a similar interpretation. McLoughlin argues that Rhode Islanders “saw the war as 
an aggressive effort by the Puritan colonies seeking to secure their claims to the land of 
the Wampanoags and Narragansetts.”59 He emphasizes the divisions among the Native 
Americans. For example, in July 1676 the Wampanoags “failed to gain the help they 
sought from the Mohawks,” and Philip was killed the next month.60 Patrick T. Conley 
argues for the importance of leaders in securing wartime victories. In his work Rhode 
Island's Founders: From Settlement to Statehood, Conley recounts the colonial history of 
Rhode Island by focusing on influential figures. In “Part I: The Pioneers,” he includes 
Native American leaders such as Massasoit and King Philip. Conley argues that the tides 
of war shifted in favor of the colonial forces in the spring of 1676 largely because of their 
“many Indian allies” and Philip's failure to unite local tribes to fight for him.61 Charles 
Carroll's Rhode Island: Three Centuries of Democracy, published in 1932, is an 
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authoritative work on the history of the state that comprises four volumes. Carroll asserts 
that military tactics secured battle victories. In Volume I, Carroll argues that King Philip's 
War could have potentially been snuffed out “almost in the borning” if the English 
organized a military movement promptly and with “vigor and thoroughness.”62 Carroll 
asserts that the conflict ended when the colonists “undertook to carry the war to the 
Indians” through ambushes.63  
Francis Jennings argues in The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and 
the Cant of Conquest that determinist theories attributing military victories to forces 
beyond human control are the products of people who wish to absolve themselves of any 
remorse in regards to the conquering of another group of people.64 The determinist 
theories of seventeenth-century writers attribute victory to God; a force that's beyond 
human and a force that makes victory pre-destined. Jennings argues that human choices 
determine military victories, and he allots ample credit to the power of colonial written 
narratives in securing victory. Jennings writes that European “invaders” to colonial-era 
America:  
...anticipated, correctly, that other Europeans would question the morality of their enterprise. 
They therefore made preparations of two sorts: guns and munitions to overpower Indian 
resistance and quantities of propaganda to overpower their countrymen's scruples. The 
propaganda gradually took standard form as an ideology with conventional assumptions and 
semantics. We live with it still.65  
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He acknowledges the importance of material resources- guns and munitions- to 
physically quell and eventually overwhelm the Indians, but written propaganda played a 
role in war too. Jennings argues that the English colonists engaged in the “pervasive 
calculated deception of the official records.”66 Of the power of human agency and written 
narratives, he writes: 
Persons and groups reaching for illicit power customarily assume attitudes of great moral 
rectitude to divert attention from the abandonment of their own moral standards of behavior. 
Deception of the multitude becomes necessary to sustain power, and the deception of others 
rapidly progresses to deception of self. All conquest atrocities have followed such paths. It would 
be incredible if ours had not.67  
James Drake, in his work King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-
1676, maintains that it should not be assumed that the English and the Native Americans 
had inevitably been headed toward a violent confrontation.68 “Inevitability,” he claims, 
assumes a force beyond human control that initiated the fighting. In writing his book, 
Drake contends that the outcome of the violent intermingling between colonists and 
original inhabitants depended more upon human choices and motives than upon 
impersonal forces.69 Drake argues that many historians make the colonial victory seem 
inevitable by pointing to factors such as numbers, technology, access to supplies and 
culture.70 But Drake maintains that neither the size of an army nor its access to 
technology and supplies necessarily determines success. During the Vietnam War: 
“American forces ostensibly had superior weaponry and finances and won the majority of 
battles, yet ultimately they suffered defeat. Such examples raise doubts about the 
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common perception that the English inevitably defeated the Indians because of their 
military superiority.”71 Drake acknowledges the complexity of war and the many factors 
at play. He generally takes more of a micro stance and focuses on the influential power of 
the individual. 
Armstrong Starkey, another proponent of human agency, argues that the adoption 
of aboriginal war tactics by the colonists secured the colonial victory. He writes in 
European and Native American Warfare: 1675-1815, that King Philip's War was “the 
first major war in which the Indians matched their European opponents in firearms.”72 
Mather acknowledged this as well.73 Since European military institutions proved to be 
“insufficiently flexible to meet the challenges of the frontier,”74 some European 
commanders “incorporated Indian allies into their forces and adopted to the Indian way 
of war.”75 Again, this reflects an older argument made by Apess.76 Coupled with the 
colonists' advantages in material resources supplied by England- which could sustain 
prolonged fighting- the English colonists secured the victory in King Philip's War.77  
Malone, on the other hand, argues for the inevitability of the conflict, which 
reflects Thomas Church’s seventeenth-century argument. But Malone asserts inevitability 
was not the work of God, as Church maintained. In The Skulking Way of War: 
Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians, Malone writes: 
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The ultimate defeat of the hostile tribes was inevitable long before the death of the man whom the 
English called King Philip. The Indians' tactical successes and their skillful use of European 
military technology were not enough to win a war against the far more numerous colonists, whose 
Indian allies, fortified garrison houses, and almost unlimited logistical support tipped the scales 
heavily.78  
Malone considers Indian military tactics and the skillful adoption of European weapons 
by the aboriginal inhabitants as micro factors; products of human choice. Though 
beneficial for the Native Americans, Malone argues that these factors were not enough to 
secure an Indian victory when faced with higher numbers of English soldiers and their 
allies and the support of England. But Malone is not a complete proponent of inevitability 
in determining the outcome of the war. He acknowledges that human agency contributed 
to the colonial victory. Like his contemporaries, and not like the seventeenth-century 
writers, Malone at least considers and acknowledges the multiple factors that contributed 
to the colonial victory. In outlining the importance of individual choices-especially the 
choices of military leaders- Malone argues that the Native Americans were far superior in 
forest combat until the English “made good use of their Indian allies and began to adopt 
some Indian tactics.”79 Douglas Edward Leach wrote what was widely considered in the 
mid-twentieth century, and still is by some today, the standard history of the war. In 
Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War, Leach also pushes the 
theme of inevitability. He argues that from the day when the first English settlers arrived 
in New England and built permanent homes, “King Philip's War became virtually 
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inevitable;” two incompatible ways of life confronted each other and only one could 
prevail.80 
War generates acts of narration, and this narration can take the form of oral 
traditions or written traditions. Jill Lepore argues that war is, at least in part, a contest for 
meaning, and the colonial victory ensured that their version of events, documented with 
pen and paper, would eclipse the Native American version of events, expressed through 
oral communication.81 Tribal networks that regulated oral transmission of knowledge 
were challenged or snuffed by “Rhode Island legal strictures and dispersions that 
disrupted the community’s ability to collectively speak or recount; and the loss of elders, 
reservoirs and caretakers of cultural knowledge, would have been specially devastating to 
these practices.”82 Local regulations strictly bound the surviving Native Americans 
following King Philip's War to such an extent that “a concerted Narragansett history of 
the war did not emerge in the postbellum period, akin to the detailed accountings of 
Increase Mather (1676) or William Hubbard (1677).”83  
Lepore holds the power of the written word in high esteem. She ponders how an 
illiterate group of people could possibly prevail over those who possess the power to 
transcribe: “If war is, at least in part, a contest for meaning, can it ever be a fair fight 
when only one side has access to those perfect instruments of empire, pens, paper, and 
printing presses?”84 Lepore gives ample credit to the power of the pen in securing 
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military victories and so, like Drake, subscribes to the argument that acute factors are 
largely influential in the determination of victors. Lepore, like other contemporary writers 
of the war, acknowledges other influential factors in the colonial victory; she recognizes 
the importance of England’s support for the colonists and she points to the use of Indian 
allies as influential sources that contributed to the colonial victory. 
Nathanial Philbrick outlines many factors that contributed to the colonial victory. 
In Mayflower: A Story of Courage, Community, and War, Philbrick does not argue for the 
inevitability of the conflict but allots credit to human agency and individual choices, 
especially the choices of military leaders. He writes: “War came to New England because 
two leaders-Philip and his English counterpart, Josiah Winslow- allowed it to happen.”85 
Along with strong leaders, Philbrick argues the colonial victory was aided by the ability 
of the colonists to outlast the Native Americans; though the colonists had suffered a 
series of devastating defeats, they could rely on England to fortify their supplies of food, 
muskets and ammunition. Philbrick identifies multiple explanations for the colonial 
victory; it depended on the choices of military leaders as well as the promise of material 
replenishment from England. He acknowledges the nuances of the war’s actors and the 
events of the war. He writes: “I soon learned that the real-life Indians and English of the 
seventeenth century were too smart, too generous, too greedy, too brave- in short, too 
human- to behave so predictably.”86 Philbrick seemingly comes across a similar 
explanation in his analysis of King Philip’s War. 
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This thesis is unique because it combines historical, archaeological and 
cultural landscape information to analyze the final and fatal attack on King Philip. 
The scholarship that began at the end of the war and continued to the present was 
critically evaluated. Archaeological site reconstruction was undertaken to 
understand the physical and cultural landscape depicting Philip’s death site. 
Modern statues and plaques that commemorate the war were investigated and 
evaluated. All of this research synthesizes to create a more holistic and complete 
understanding of the war and the specific event that essentially ended it.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CULTURAL COMPARISON OF WEAPONS AND WAR TACTICS  
Weapons and War: English 
 Early explorers and settlers brought with them to New England iron weapons: 
guns and knives; the majority of firearms carried by those who made landfall in 1621 
were matchlock muskets. Bows existed in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, 
but only men of upper classes hunted and such a practice was considered sport.87 In 
England, “bows, still common under Queen Elizabeth, soon went out of style as hunting 
weapons, and firearms did not immediately replace them.”88 The hunting skills of the 
colonists paled in comparison to the native inhabitants of New England. It was common 
practice to hunt with hounds and hawks in England, and let those animals do the killing.89 
European weapons were brought to the New World to protect the colonists from wild 
animals and aggressors; the weapons were also the means of supplying colonists with 
food and commodities to send back to England.90 Because of their importance, the 
colonists craved the most efficient types and their skill in using the firearms soon out-
distanced the Europeans in the Old World.91 
 Simple in operation, a matchlock musket lowered a lighted match, held in a 
device called a serpentine, into an open pan of priming powder. By pulling a trigger or 
depressing a lever, the musketeer forced the serpentine to rotate against a restraining 
spring, and the match dipped into the priming powder. The contact between the match 
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and powder set off an explosive chain starting in the pan, traveling through a touch hole 
to the propellant charge in the barrel. The projectile, usually a large lead ball weighing a 
twelfth of a pound, was expelled from the barrel.92  
 The matchlock musket was an effective arm for the large formations characteristic 
of European armies, but it was cumbersome and weighed up to twenty pounds. It was 
also a short-range weapon, only accurate within fifty yards of the target, and it had to be 
fired using a forked rest.93 Regardless, the weapon was appropriate for European infantry 
actions in which ranks of musketeers fired concentrated volleys at close ranges.94 But 
though the weapon was suited for the battlefields of Europe, it was inappropriate in New 
England, where forest warfare dominated. In England, military commanders did not 
worry about ambushes, night attacks, or enemies who took cover behind trees.95 The 
matchlock wasn’t suited for the New England climate and landscape. Before firing the 
gun, a matchlock required the musketeer to light his match (a cord treated with saltpeter 
or gunpowder). Such a process was time consuming, especially since a match typically 
burned on both ends and had to be adjusted frequently. Also, a match burned at a rate of 
up to nine inches an hour, and so extra caches of cord had to be carried and kept dry on 
the field.96 Matches also produced light and an odor. These side effects were dangerous in 
forest warfare. A successful ambush required discreetness and convenience, and 
matchlock muskets could not adequately provide that in New England.  
 Some professional soldiers and affluent colonists brought with them to the New 
World more expensive and more advanced firearms. Captain Myles Standish, a military 
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leader in Plymouth Colony, brought with him to New England a snaphaunce, which was 
self-igniting and required no rest to steady it while firing.97 Realizing that matchlocks 
were inefficient in forest warfare, military leaders like Myles Standish and John Endicott 
convinced their colonial governments to purchase flintlocks as common arms.98 In 1646, 
Plymouth Colony required each town to maintain in reserve, as public arms, two 
flintlocks for every thirty men.99 The advantages of flintlocks were soon realized by the 
colonists. Malone writes: “the transition to flintlocks was apparently complete in the 
colony's militia bands years before the outbreak of King Philip's War in 1675. The 
lessons learned in that devastating struggle prompted Plymouth officials to ban the 
military use of matchlocks in 1677.”100 The colonists who fought in King Philip's War 
were armed almost entirely with flintlocks, though their governments had not yet 
formalized this transition from matchlocks to flintlocks in law. Massachusetts Bay 
Colony finally enacted such a law in 1693; Connecticut Colony never did.101  
 Peterson divides the arms of the early settlers into three categories: defensive 
armor, edged weapons, and projectile weapons. An armed man in the earlier part of 1620-
1690 was equipped with at least one article in each category. A corselet, sword and 
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musket were the most common.102 Armor at that time consisted of a corselet, a back and 
breast plate of hammered iron or steel; protection for the thighs, groin, neck, and a helmet 
for the head. The Massachusetts Bay Company purchased 60 suits of armor in 1628.103 
Men from the Mayflower's first exploratory expedition wore corselets, which proved 
beneficial. Peterson argues that the armor offset the danger of aboriginal arrows. The bow 
was a more accurate and more efficient weapon compared to the average colonial musket, 
but the arrows could not pierce armor so easily.104 Armor was heavy though, and proved 
cumbersome since most confrontations played out in forests. Peterson argues: “In time 
the settlers found that they could dodge the Indian arrows unless taken by surprise; and 
then later the savages obtained guns, against which armor was of little use. Confronted 
with this situation, the settlers decided in favor of freer movement.”105 By the time of 
King Philip's War, the corselet was replaced by heavy leather or quilted coats.106 Armor 
had its weaknesses, but it was deemed useful enough to keep in some form for King 
Philip's War. Peterson writes of seventeenth-century soldiers in Plymouth Colony: 
The soldiers wore body armor, which was proof against arrows; and 
when attacked by small bodies of Indians, they could hold their 
own. However, their offensive weapons were so inefficient that a 
vigorous and persistent Indian attack could have wiped out the 
colony. When the Pequots began such an offensive in 1637, the 
Indians' chance of success had passed. The settler still wore body 
armor, but the inefficient matchlock had been partially replaced by 
a flint arm. The Indian had no armor to stop a bullet and 
comparatively few serviceable firearms.107  
 
 It was customary for all soldiers of the early seventeenth century to carry swords 
and knives. The usual procedure in combat: fire a volley, discard the musket, draw the 
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sword and charge.108 There were common stores of arms for the early settlers but there 
was no standard equipment; each man supplied his own weaponry, and so there was a 
decent amount of variation.109 By the time of King Philip's War, knives and hatchets were 
preferred by colonists for hand-to-hand combat over the sword.110 Peterson argues: “these 
weapons were nearly universally possessed because of their utility in everyday life. There 
was good precedent for their use in combat.”111 The colonists recognized the practicality 
of such weapons in the New England landscape, and so adopted these tools that doubled 
as killing machines. The pike was another edged European weapon brought to the New 
World by the colonists. For seventeenth-century European armies, pikes played a 
significant role. The musketeer was only beginning to take shape in Europe when 
colonists broke off for New England; the settlers of Massachusetts Bay brought with 
them 60 pikes and 20 half-pikes, nearly as many pikes as muskets.112 But pikes weren't 
ideal in the New England country. Averaging 15 feet in length, the long shafts of pikes 
made them hard to use in forest combat. In Europe, pikes were used on open battlefields, 
and then primarily to hold ground gained by the soldiers; the pikemen drove the butts of 
their weapons into the ground to present a fortress of pointed pikes. But, as Peterson 
points out, Indian fighting didn’t involve pitched battles, cavalry or charges, and so pikes 
were virtually useless.113 On October 13, 1675, a few months after the outbreak of King 
Philip's War, the Massachusetts General Court declared all pikemen to furnish 
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themselves with firearms.114 From 1630 to 1675, there was a change in firearm use and 
preference among colonial armies.115 Listed in inventories and court records, matches are 
referenced more than flints until the outbreak of the Pequot War in 1636. From then on, 
tales of snap-shooting increased and records of ambushes indicate that flint arms 
increased in popularity and use.116  
 The matchlock musket was in many ways inferior to the aboriginal bow; Peterson 
argues that its chief merit lies in the panic it produced by the flash, smoke, smell and 
noise of the explosion of the charge.117 A gun, too, could be loaded with several bullets 
and wound a number of adversaries with one shot.118 Firelocks outdistanced matchlocks 
in forest warfare, though. With firelock muskets, the powder in the priming pan was 
ignited by striking a piece of flint against a piece of steel called a frizzen. The frizzen was 
poised directly over the pan so that the sparks produced by the contact of the flint and 
steel would drop into the pan. The pan had a cover so the powder could be kept dry. 
Without the need for matches and the pan cover, a flint-functioning firearm could 
discharge in dampness and even light rain, making it better suited for forest warfare in 
New England than the matchlock musket.119 In fact: 
With the coming of King Philip's War, the era of the 
matchlock in America was definitely past. The 
campaigns of that war, forays into the wilderness, 
night attacks, ambushes, battles in the rain, and the 
encounters between individuals which required snap-
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shooting indicate clearly that the snaphance was the 
principal weapon.120 
 
Weapons and War: Indians 
 Some archaeologists believe that humans first migrated to the Americas from 
Asia at least 12,000 to 15,000 years ago.121 Overtime, the descendants of those people 
moved south and east.122 It’s believed that the first settlers of Rhode Island were mobile 
and “their implements, made of stone and bone, were designed for killing and cutting up 
animals. They were lightweight tools such as spear points, knives, and scrapers.”123 The 
most easily recognizable objects surviving from this period are fluted points, which are 
tapered stone spear points.124 These stones were used by hunters; a point was attached to 
a wooden spear and thrown or thrust at an animal.125 To craft the these tools, people 
carved a groove on both sides of the stone point; that groove was known as the flute, and 
it allowed the point to be fit into a wooden shaft.126 Fluted points were made by detaching 
two long channel-shaped flakes with a tool of bone or antler; a difficult task, the 
toolmaker likely made several failed attempts before making the perfect groove.127 One 
such broken point provides the earliest evidence of people in Rhode Island; it was 
recovered at the South Wind site near Wickford Cove in North Kingstown; the point was 
dated to craftsmanship 10,000 years ago.128 Archaeologists argue that one hallmark of 
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Late Woodland and Late Prehistoric cultures was the use of the bow and arrow.129 This 
argument is reflected in the archaeological record as “smaller, often triangular projectile 
points considered diagnostic of the Late Woodland throughout the Eastern 
Woodlands.”130 The technological change from spears with large points to bows and 
arrows with smaller projectile points could be associated with more efficient and intense 
deer hunting, but it may also be associated with increases in inter-group conflict and 
warfare.131 The authors of Seeking Our Past: An Introduction to North American 
Archaeology assert that archaeological evidence for intergroup conflict among people in 
the Eastern Woodlands, particularly in the Late Prehistoric period, is reflected both in 
injuries found in burial populations and in the presence of palisaded villages at the 
time.132  
The aboriginal bow as a tool for hunting and inter-tribal warfare extended to its 
use in warfare with the European colonists for most of the seventeenth century, but the 
aboriginal arsenal was eventually supplemented with guns.133 The efficiency of a weapon 
is determined by the strength and accuracy of the weapon itself but also by the skill of the 
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person who uses the weapon.134 The native inhabitants of New England were skilled 
hunters and efficient at using their bows, which were sturdy and powerful weapons. 
According to Leveillee, Waller Jr. and Ingram: “The late pre-contact environment 
in southern Rhode Island supported a rich and diverse floral and faunal resource base 
available for human exploitation.”135 Rhode Island’s salt ponds especially “were dynamic 
settings in which diverse and abundant plant and animal communities thrives, with 
eelgrass as a keystone species.”136 In the excavation of  RI 100, a large site distributed 
over a 72-acre parcel in Narragansett, Rhode Island, archaeologists with The Public 
Archaeology Laboratory, Inc., recovered oyster shell, bone fragments, quart, quartzite, 
argillite debitage, fire-cracked rock, and argillite tool, Indian pottery sherds and several 
Late Woodland projectile points.137 Shellfish were abundant in southern Rhode Island in 
the late pre-contact period, as well as finfish and migratory and resident bird and 
waterfowl species.138 The abundance of fish in the coastal waters was the original reason 
that Breton, Portuguese, and Bristol fishermen had started to fish in the area in the 
fifteenth century.139 After living in New England for four years, civilian William Wood 
wrote of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and published his observations in 1634's New 
England's Prospect. He wrote of New England in 1634: “there is no country known that 
yields more variety of fish winter and summer.”140 Birds like turkey were abundant in the 
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region and hunted for their meat.141 Wood wrote: “some (native inhabitants) killed ten or 
a dozen in half a day. If they can be found towards an evening and watched where they 
perch, if one come about ten or eleven of the clock, he may shoot...they will sit unless 
they be slenderly wounded.”142   
The interior or near-interior freshwater lakes, rivers, streams and wetlands also 
supported various mammal species like grey squirrels, beavers, river otters, raccoons, red 
and grey foxes, rabbits and white-tailed deer.143 The abundance of such animals coupled 
with the need for protein, skins and furs necessitated the need for weapons that allowed 
for the killing and processing of these animals. In 1605, James Rosier of England wrote 
of a voyage to the Maine coast and described the hunt for a whale. Aboriginal bows and 
arrows were used to kill the animal: 
He is 12 fathoms long; and that they go in company of their King with a multitude of 
their boats, and strike him with a bone made in fashion of a harping iron fastened to a 
rope, when they make great and strong of the barke of trees, which they veare out 
after him; then all their boats come about him, and as he riseth above water, with their 
arrowes they shoot him to death...144  
 
Writing in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Thomas Morton described the deer 
as “the most usefull and most beneficiall beast” of the region.145 Deer were numerous 
enough to supply meat year-round for the native inhabitants of New England.146 Men 
used a variety of techniques to hunt: “game might be stalked with bow and arrow by a 
lone hunter or by groups of two or three hundred men working together.”147 Giovanni da 
Verrazano, a Florentine sailor, wrote in 1524 that species such as stags, deer and lynxes 
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were captured by the native inhabitants with snares and bows: “the latter being their chief 
implement.”148 Prey could be tricked, and “run between specially planted hedges more 
than a mile in length until it was finally driven into the weapons of waiting hunters.”149 
But Cronon warns that simple measures of caloric content tend to undervalue the 
importance of the fall and winter hunt to an agricultural village's subsistence cycle.150 
Animals were not only sources of food, their skins and furs were also used to clothe and 
warm the native inhabitants of southern New England. The abundance of animals and the 
need for protein and clothing necessitated the need for hunting weapons, and hardwood 
trees were plentiful in the region and sufficient to craft weapons to kill these animals.151  
 Southern New England forests (forests in Connecticut, Rhode Island and the 
eastern fourth of Massachusetts) were dense with a variety of central hardwoods: black, 
red and white oaks; chestnut, the hickories, and some hemlock and scattered white 
pine.152 According to Leveillee et al.: 
 …pollen cores from the Pettaquamscutt River in Narragansett indicate the dominant forest circa 
(ca.) 2000 years B.P. included mixed red oak and white pine with some hickory, birch, túpelo, 
and beech. Pollen data from North Kingstown indicate that around 1400 B.P. oak remained the 
dominant forest species followed by alder, mixed with a minimal amount of pine and birch.153  
 
Oak and hickory were probably the most common woods used for bows, but many other 
species of tree supplied sufficient material to craft strong bows.154 Arrows were made of 
felsite, quartz or quartzite found in the region.155 Whether hunting big game or used in 
combat, the arrowhead was designed “to penetrate deeply, cut severely, and remain 
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lodged in the victim. An arrow has little shocking power on impact, but with a sharp head 
it becomes a deadly, hemorrhage-producing projectile.”156 Writing in 1605, James Rosier 
of England wrote of a voyage to the Maine coast, and described the bows of a group of 
native inhabitants he encountered: 
Their bow is made of Wich Hazell, and some of Beech in fashion 
much like our bowes, but they want nocks, onely a string of leather 
put through a hole at one end, and made fast with a knot at the 
other. Their arrowes are made of the same wood, some of Ash, big 
and long, with three feathers tied on, and nocked very artificiallie: 
headed with the long shanke bone of a Deere, made very sharpe 
with two fangs in manner of a harping iron. They have likewise 
Darts, headed with like bone, one of which I darted among the 
rockes, and it brake not. These were use very cunningly, to kill fish, 
fowle and beasts.157  
 
 The aboriginal bows were described by Europeans as moderately strong compared 
to English bows.158 James Rosier drew an aboriginal witch hazel bow during his voyage 
along the Maine coast in 1605 and wrote that the bow had the strength to carry the arrow 
five or six score.159 Though its capacity to travel a certain distance was limited, the hunter 
or warrior also determined the bow's success at dealing a devastating blow onto a 
target.160 Thomas Lechford observed the accuracy of native inhabitants with their bows 
and arrows at short ranges, remarking they were “very good at a short mark.”161  
 The devastation wrought by a bow depends, in part, on the distance between the 
bow holder and the target.162 Malone notes the weaknesses of bows: he argues that if 
someone shoots an arrow in a forest, and he is a considerable distance from his target, he 
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risks hitting branches and missing his shot.163 In a field fight, at a considerable distance 
from the target, the archer needs to shoot high in the air in order for the arrow to descend 
on the target. But that slow, overarching flight gives the target time to dodge the arrow.164 
Mason argues that distance, wind, varying elasticity of the bow, varying weight of the 
arrow, shape of the arrow and penetrability of the game determine the success of the 
weapon.165 Mason asserts that “each one of these variables is rendered as constant as 
possible by the hunter, in skulking, getting to windward, using wood of the greatest 
strength for bows, and making one's own arrows.”166 Early colonists testified to the 
Native Americans' skilled mitigation of these potential hindrances. William Wood wrote: 
“when they get sight of a deer, moose, or bear, they study how to get the wind of him, 
and approaching within shot, stab their mark quite through, if the bones hinder not.”167  
 When the aboriginal inhabitants of New England closed with their enemies in 
combat, they relied on clubs and axes; “a fight that began with exchanges of arrows often 
ended with a rush by axe- or club-swinging warriors.”168 Detailing events of the Pequot 
War in 1637, John Mason wrote of a band of Pequots that charged the Mohegans, allies 
of the English. As the enemy encroached, the Mohegans did not move “until the other 
came within thirty or forty Paces of them; then they run and met them,” and struck blows 
with hatchets and knives.169 The native inhabitants of southern New England used 
smooth, grooveless heads of various sizes for their war axes.170 Warriors carried 
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“tomahawks, made of wood like a pole axe, with a sharpened stone fastened therein.”171 
Early colonists often used the word “tomahawk” to refer to ball-headed wooden clubs, 
stone hammers, stone axes, or other striking instruments.172 The tomahawk, a type of 
stone axe, was made by forcing the tapered end of a smooth stone head through a hole in 
a solid wood handle; the tool was strong enough to withstand the rigors of combat and 
could be used for woodcutting as well.173  
 Malone argues that warfare is often limited in its scope and ferocity “by the 
deliberate restraint of combatants and by the capabilities of their technology.”174 He 
asserts that “Indians did undertake prolonged sieges of fortified positions on occasion and 
would sometimes meet in open fields for battles or skirmishes involving large numbers of 
warriors. In all these forms of warfare, relatively few participants were ever killed.”175 
Roger Williams noted of Indian wars: “their Warres are farre lesse bloudy, and devouring 
then the cruell Warres of Europe; and seldome twenty slaine in a pitcht field.”176 Writing 
in 1943, Turney-High offers his interpretation of Native American warfare: to achieve the 
motive, the enemy must be obliterated entirely, and “nonliterate warriors” failed to grasp 
this.177 For most Native American tribes, “the objective was often gained by vindicating 
honor, or slapping someone in the face with a quirt rather than killing him.”178 Like 
Malone and Williams, Turney-High subscribes to the argument that Native American 
warfare was limited; he interprets Native American warfare as small-scale relative to 
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European warfare. Writing in 1988, Hirsch argues in “The Collision of Military Cultures 
in Seventeenth-Century New England” that “if waged in the name of retaliation, an 
Indian war ostensibly ceased when the aggrieved had inflicted retribution.”179   
Ambushes and raids on villages were much more frequent than actual battles.180 
Turney-High argues that “sociological patterns demanded that the raid and the 
ambuscade remain the chief types of operations” in Native American warfare; other 
historians reasoned that personal vendettas or other issues between tribes didn't 
necessitate organized armies but ambushes or raids with objectives narrow in scope and 
minimum bloodshed.181 Malone posits that fire was not a favored weapon used by the 
Native Americans in their wars, which indicates a reluctance to utterly destroy.182 He 
argued that the limited scope of aboriginal warfare-to quell personal vendettas or the like-
rendered fire too horrible and deadly to use.183 
English observers thought this restriction in the numbers of deaths and level of 
destruction wrought in times of conflict made violent native encounters look like games. 
William Wood was unimpressed with Native American wars, remarking that “they do not 
now practice anything in martial feats worth observation.”184 The most significant war 
activity the Indians partook in was the building of “forts to fly into” in the case of an 
enemy ambush.185 When they engaged in war Wood thought the Native Americans to be 
unorganized, with no marching, ranks, or files. He remarked: the Native Americans “let 
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fly their winged shaftments without either fear or wit. Their artillery being spent, he that 
hath no arms to fight, finds legs to run away.”186 The colonial observances of aboriginal 
warfare and analyses of that warfare by historians in the twentieth century reveal a 
pattern of regarding Indian warfare as small-scale relative to English warfare. Because 
Indian warfare is evaluated against the backdrop of English warfare, it’s instantly seen as 
less catastrophic and intense. Fights and deaths among the Indians were surely 
devastating to those involved, no matter the body count.  
 The reasons for fighting varied; New England Indians may have fought to gain 
prestige and power, to demonstrate courage and combat skills, to resist offensive actions, 
dominate weaker neighbors, to seize tribute, gain hunting territory and fishing rights, to 
control trade or to avenge real or imagined wrongdoings.187 James Axtell argues that 
antagonisms and irritations often feed the fires of war and “the ardent spirits of the 
greedy, the proud, and the young can never be thoroughly dampened.”188 Williams noted 
that mockery between powerful tribal figures “is a great kindling of Warres amongst 
them.”189 Daniel Gookin, a Puritan missionary and magistrate of the Massachusetts 
Colony, wrote in 1674 that the Indians were “very revengeful, and will not be unmindful 
to take vengeance upon such as have injured them or their kindred.”190 Malone notes that 
a disastrous plague hit the coast of New England in 1616 and decimated the aboriginal 
populations; the disruption of the balance of power, since some tribes were ravaged by 
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the sickness while others avoided it, may have contributed to increased inter-tribal 
aggression.191  
Trade and Guns 
 The Mayflower made landfall at Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1621, but the 
introduction of European trade items to the Indians in New England had begun before 
permanent settlement by Europeans.192 Verrazano was commissioned by Francis I in 
1523 to cross the Atlantic in search of a sea route to Catbay. Before entering Newport 
Harbor, Verrazano wrote of twenty small boats approaching his ship, the Native 
Americans “came near enough for us to toss to them some little bells and glasses.”193 He 
noted that the Native Americans prized the colonial bells, azure crystals and toys; “when 
we showed them our arms, they expressed no admiration, and only asked how they were 
made.”194 Native Americans in Cape Cod took knives, fish hooks, and sharpened steel 
from Verrazano and his crew.195 George Waymouth embarked on a voyage to the Maine 
coast in 1605, commissioned to select a location for a settlement; James Rosier 
accompanied Waymouth and wrote an account of the voyage. Knives, glasses, combs and 
“other trifles” were traded with the Native Americans.196  
 The adoption of European guns by the Native Americans had a dramatic effect on 
their military system.197 Despite the superior rate of fire of aboriginal bows, Native 
                                                           
191 Malone, 27. 
192 Christina B. Johannsen, “European Trade Goods and Wampanoag Culture in the Seventeenth Century,” 
in Burr’s Hill, a 17th century Wampanoag burial ground in Warren, Rhode Island, ed. Susan Gibson, Studies 
in anthropology and material culture (Providence, Rhode Island: Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology, 
Brown University, 1980), 25. 
193 Winship, 14. 
194 Ibid., 16. 
195 Ibid., 22. 
196 Winship, 118. 
197 Malone, 29. 
41 
 
Americans quickly recognized the advantages of muskets both on the hunt and in war.198 
Bullets flew faster than arrows and took a more direct route to the target. Also, the heavy 
lead projectiles were less likely to deflect off overhanging branches; they were also 
nearly impossible to dodge and more damaging upon impact.199 “In sharp contrast to the 
majority of English colonists, New England Indians chose flintlocks over matchlocks 
almost immediately,” according to Malone; the aboriginal inhabitants of New England 
recognized, as early as 1607, the weaknesses in the ignition system of the matchlock 
musket.200 Writing in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, Gookin observed that as 
a result of trade with the English, Dutch and French, the native inhabitants of New 
England “generally disuse their former weapons, and instead thereof have guns, pistols, 
swords, rapier blades, fastened unto a staff of the length of a half pike, hatchets and 
axes.”201 More Native Americans in southern New England began to use firearms in the 
1620s. By the beginning of King Philip's War in 1675, most Indian hunters and fighters 
had flintlock muskets or carbines.202 The colonial weapons enabled the Native Americans 
to hunt more efficiently and gather ample furs, which were coveted by the colonists. With 
the arrival of the colonists and demand for trade items, Native American tribes had more 
incentives to compete with one another; coupled with flintlocks, opportunities for 
aggression and domination grew among the Native Americans of New England.203  
 Thomas Morton wrote of Plymouth Colony governor William Bradford's 
observations of Native Americans and European guns: 
                                                           
198 Ibid., 29, 31. 
199 Ibid., 31. 
200 Ibid., 33, 35. 
201 Gookin, 152. 
202 Malone, 42. 
203 Malone, 40. 
42 
 
Hearing what gain the French and fishermen made by trading of pieces, powder and 
shot to the Indians, he, as the head of this consortship, began the practice of the 
same in these parts. And first he taught them to use them, to charge and discharge, 
and what proportion of powder to give the piece, according to the size and bigness 
of the same; and what shot to use for fowl and what for deer. And having thus 
instructed them, he employed some of them to hunt and fowl for him, so as they 
became far more active in that employment than any of the English, by reason of 
their swiftness of foot and nimbleness of body; being also quick sighted, and by 
continual exercise well knowing the haunts of all sorts of game. So as when they 
saw the execution that a piece would do, and the benefit that might come by the 
same, they became mad, as it were, after them, and would not (stick) to give any 
price they could attain to for them; accounting their bows and arrows but bawbles in 
comparison of them.204  
 
Morton evidences the Native American preference for firearms over aboriginal bows and 
also their skill in using guns.  
Tactics 
 Tactics in hunting and warfare evolve to accommodate the accuracy of the 
weapons and the objective of the hunter or warrior; they are also affected by the physical 
environment and the cultural tendencies of the hunters or warriors. Malone argues that 
“most colonists in the first three quarters of the seventeenth century thought of warfare in 
terms of formal battles and single-minded dedication to the destruction of the enemy.”205 
In violent encounters, English colonists wanted the Native Americans to fight in the 
open; they wanted more military discipline from the Native American enemy. John 
Mason, chief commander of the Connecticut forces during the Pequot War (1636-1637) 
was disappointed with the result of a battle between his Mohegan allies and a band of 
Pequots: one hundred Mohegans descended on sixty Pequots, and struck them with 
arrows and cut them with hatchets and knives in a way that appeared disorganized and 
“feeble” to Mason, who remarked “it did hardly deserve the Name of Fighting.”206 In the 
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aftermath of the Mistick Fight, it is evident by this sentence: “There was at the Foot of 
the Hill a small Brook, where we rested and refreshed ourselves, having by that time 
taught them a little more Manners than to disturb us,” that Mason didn't take the enemy 
seriously.207  
 Malone argues that, although the Native American warriors retained more 
individual freedom in acts of war than did soldiers in the disciplined ranks of a European 
army, they still employed tactical plans.208 (Malone 107) In fact, “their ambushes and 
raids required a high level of tactical skill and coordination. Just to move a body of men 
secretly through the forest was a serious military problem,” and fighting in the forest 
presented challenges only good tactical control could overcome. “Most English observers 
failed to see the tactical sophistication that often shaped aboriginal military actions. Men 
who fought apart from their comrades, who hid behind trees and fired at will, seemed by 
European standards to have no real military skill or tactical order.”209 Skulking behind 
trees was to English observers dishonorable but to Indian soldiers a cunning and effective 
strategy. Native Americans in New England made the terrain and vegetation their 
allies.210 Williams observed that when the Narragansetts fought in the woods “every Tree 
is a Bucklar.”211  
 Mobility was critical in Native American warfare, and rapid travel can be 
considered an offensive action that, like fire, is meant to shock the enemy.212 Turney-
High argues “fire, mobility, and shock imply aggression, the great principle of the 
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offensive.”213 Offensive actions were generally well observed in the New World, and the 
Native Americans preferred “close-up shock work,” enlisting the use of clubs and axes to 
administer crushing blows.214 Offensive actions for the native inhabitants of New 
England usually took the form of ambushes. Armor was uncommon for Native 
Americans in warfare, likely due to the nature of their wars; it was heavy and hindered 
mobility in the execution of an ambush. Armor was largely shunned by Native Americans 
because of the weight and impracticality of such a device in ambushes and raids, which 
required swiftness. 
 To not only stay mobile but to move stealthily and quickly required technological 
aids for the New England environment. Moccasins, manufactured from deer or moose, 
were light-weight, comfortable and quiet in the forest. When winter snows cloaked the 
region, Native Americans strapped snowshoes to their feet and moved freely over deep 
drifts to reach game or enemies.215 The ambush was not a simple military operation; 
factors other than footwear, which proved a burden onto itself, had to be weighed before 
executing the military feat. Malone writes: 
When the Indians set an ambush, they tried to pick a location where they 
could achieve complete surprise and hold their opponents long enough to 
inflict casualties or take prisoners. The choice of terrain was very important, 
for natural features like cliffs, rivers, or lakes could block a route of escape 
and make it easier to pin the victims in a vulnerable position. If there were 
no obstacles on at least one side of the location, the Indians would usually 
try to close a circle around the enemy at the moment of attack. The ambush 
position also had to offer good concealment for the attacking force; catching 
your opponents unaware was the key to success.216 
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Ambushes and raids were timed to catch opponents off guard and cause confusion; 
“attacks in darkness, at first light, and during storms or conditions of heavy fog gave the 
raiders a better chance of success.”217  
 In May 1637, Captain John Mason commanded ninety men enlisted by the 
Connecticut Colony to march against the Pequots. In his account of the war, written years 
later, Mason explains why a certain route to reach the enemy was chosen: “Their 
Numbers far exceeded ours; having sixteen Guns with Powder and Shot, as we were 
informed by the two Captives.”218 Out-gunned, the colonial army adopted a Native 
American way of war and opted for an ambush. Mason wrote: “By Narragansett we 
should come upon their Backs and possibly might surprise them unaware...which proved 
very successful.”219 When they believed they drew near, Mason and his council 
convened; “And being informed by the Indians (allies) that the Enemy had two Forts 
almost impregnable; but we were not at all Discouraged, but rather Animated, in so much 
that we were resolved to Assault both their Forts at once.”220 Mason implies that he and 
his men were giddy with the thought of more destruction and bloodshed. A preference for 
total warfare, the prospect of burning two forts rather than one excited Mason. The place 
of the fort being Mistick, the fight came to be known as the Mistick Fight, and 
approximately 500 Native American men, women and children were slaughtered by the 
colonial army. With the ambush, “the Mischief they intended to us, came upon their own 
Pate: They were taken in their own Snare.”221 With such language as “taken in their own 
Snare,” Mason implies the tactic used, an ambush, which secured the colonial victory, 
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was originally a Native American offensive method. Mason smugly suggests that he 
learned and he learned well; he gave the enemy a deadly dose of their own medicine. 
Mason and his men fought like Indians, and they won.  
 Mason described one ambush during the Pequot War: “...some of them lay in 
Ambush behind Rocks and Trees, often shooting at us, yet through Mercy touched not 
one of us.”222 As a protective and counteractive measure, Mason's army, as they 
approached any swamp or thicket, shot into the passage to reveal any potential skulkers. 
He wrote that “some of them fell with our Shot; and probably more might, but for want of 
Munition.”223 Ammunition was limited, but even so colonists used it to clear passages, 
not aiming for specific targets but simply firing and hoping for the best. Such a tactic 
demonstrates the colonial recognition of the lethal potential of forest concealment and the 
great potential for an enemy ambush. The colonists must have felt confident in firing 
their limited ammunition that it would likely not be wasted; there were skulkers where 
they shot.  
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Chapter 4 
ARCHAEOLOGY 
Orser and Fagan define modern archaeology as “the systematic study of humanity 
in the past.”224 Archaeologists and historians often divide the span of human existence 
into prehistoric (before written documents and archives) and historic (that portion of 
human history that begins with written records) times.225 Historical archaeology is the 
archaeological study of people documented in recent history, and so is the type of 
archaeology used when dealing with Rhode Island sites dated to the years of European 
colonization.226 Orser and Fagan argue that archaeology “is as much a part of the study of 
history as the historic building, crabbed document, or government archive.”227 Neusius 
and Gross assert that the most important point underscored by the archaeology of the 
Protohistoric period “is that the socio-cultural systems into which Europeans were 
beginning to interject themselves were dynamic systems in their own right.”228 It’s 
important to regard the Indian people and their belongings that were recovered via 
archaeological excavations not as passive recipients to European colonizers but complex 
people enmeshed in “economic, social, and political interactions.”229  
 Archaeological excavations are typically sensitive undertakings, especially when 
they involve human remains. In a 2003 article, Paul Robinson and John Brown wrote: 
“on the issue of who controls the practice of archaeology in Rhode Island, the SHPO 
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[State Historic Preservation Office aka The Rhode Island Historical Preservation and 
Heritage Commission] and the NITHPO [Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic 
Preservation Office] sharply disagree with each other.”230 Archaeologists and Native 
American tribes collaborated successfully with the excavation in the 1970s of RI 1000, 
but disagreed on some details that were published in the RIHPHC book Native American 
Archaeology.231 In August 2017, the Pokanoket Tribe occupied Brown University 
property in Bristol; the tribe established an encampment on a part of the 375-acre 
property near the Heffenreffer Museum collections center. During a peaceful 
demonstration in Providence on September of that year, the tribe explained to a 
Providence Journal reporter the property was “sacred ground” (believed to be a gathering 
place of Philip and his followers) and claimed a right to the land along with other Native 
American groups, including the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), the 
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, the Assonet Band of the Wampanoag Nation, the Herring 
Pond Wampanoag Tribe, the Pocasset Wampanoag Tribe and the Narragansett Indian 
Tribe.232 Brown and the Pokanoket Tribe eventually reached an agreement, which they 
officiated on September 21, 2017. The agreement outlined a plan for Brown to transfer a 
portion of its Bristol property into a preservation trust to ensure the conservation of the 
land and sustainable access by Native American tribes in the region.233 The Pokanoket 
ended their encampment on September 25, 2017. The ramifications of King Philip’s War 
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reverberate today in land disputes and disagreement over archaeological sites and 
materials. It’s important to appreciate the complex human issues at stake behind scientific 
evaluations.  
This chapter demonstrates archaeology’s strength in yielding physical evidence 
for Indian adoption of colonial firearms. The focus will be on a Wampanoag burial 
ground dated to the seventeenth century in Warren, Rhode Island. The next section will 
focus on the archaeology of the site where King Philip was allegedly killed by a soldier 
under the direction of Benjamin Church. 
Physical Setting 
  Bristol, Rhode Island is twenty-one square miles in area and located in Bristol 
County on the eastern shore of Narragansett Bay. Bristol is sixteen miles southeast of 
Providence and seventeen miles north of Newport. It is bordered on the north by the town 
of Warren.234 Most of Bristol's boundary is water. Narragansett Bay forms the western 
boundary while Mount Hope Bay and the Kickemuit River form the eastern boundary. 
Bristol occupies two promontories and is shaped roughly like a lobster claw; 
Poppasquash Neck extends like the smaller digit from the western side of Bristol Neck. 
Bristol Harbor is set between the two peninsulas.235 
 Bristol's topography is the result of the retreat of the last great glacier, which 
reached as far south as Block Island about eighteen thousand years ago. As the glacier 
melted, the sea level rose and water flooded inland, creating the irregular and indented 
coastline of Narragansett Bay. In general, Bristol's land is low-lying and vulnerable to 
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floods, but on the southeast shore of Bristol Neck, Mount Hope rises 221 feet to form the 
high point on Mount Hope Bay. Mount Hope has a large outcrop of granite gneiss on its 
west escarpment and a white quartz outcrop on the east, known as King Philip's Chair.236 
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Map of Warren, Rhode Island, showing location of Burr’s Hill.237  
                                                           
237 From Susan Gibson, Burr’s Hill, a seventeenth century Wampanoag burial ground in Warren, Rhode 
Island, Studies in anthropology and material culture (Providence, Rhode Island: Haffenreffer Museum of 
Anthropology, Brown University, 1980). 
52 
 
Archaeology of Burr’s Hill 
Archaeological evidence provides physical evidence that Native Americans 
adopted European weapons. Burr's Hill, a natural gravel bank overlooking the eastern 
shore of the Warren River in Warren, Rhode Island, is the site of a Wampanoag burial 
ground. Before 1873, when the boundary between the towns of Warren and Bristol was 
moved, Burr's Hill had been situated at the northern end of Bristol.238 Bristol occupies 
Mount Hope Neck, where Philip allegedly made his headquarters.239  
 During the spring and summer of 1913, 42 burials along with their associated 
grave goods were unearthed at Burr's Hill.240 Compared with other Northeastern contact 
period burial grounds, the Burr's Hill site was comparatively rich in terms of the quantity 
of material remains recovered.241 Most of the surviving objects from the Burr's Hill site 
can be reliably dated to the third quarter of the seventeenth century, which would place it 
in the appropriate time frame for this study.242  
 Adoption of European material culture including weaponry is reflected in the 
material from Burr's Hill.243 In fact, “the overwhelming majority of the objects found in 
the graves at Burr's Hill are either European imports or were made with European tools or 
materials.”244 Though it is important to remember that “the proportion of European to 
aboriginal objects found in the graves at Burr's Hill may not reflect their relative 
proportions in daily use,” the weapons interred with the dead still show a mesh of 
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cultures and handling of European materials by the Native Americans, specifically the 
Wampanoags.245 The archaeological evidence coupled with historic evidence helps us 
understand the use of European weapons by Native Americans during King Philip's War. 
 
 
 
Burr's Hill, February 2018. Photo: Laura Damon. 
 
 Burr's Hill itself was purchased by the town of Warren in 1921 and made into a 
public park.246 According to local tradition, Warren was the site of Sowams, the principal 
village of the Wampanoag sachem Ousamequin, known to the Pilgrims as Massasoit.247 
The human remains recovered from Burr's Hill were likely Wampanoags based on the 
location of the burial ground and the date of the artifacts associated with the remains. The 
human remains at Burr's Hill were disinterred repeatedly throughout the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and early years of the 20th century through various construction 
projects. The construction of the Providence, Warren, and Bristol Railroad, which opened 
                                                           
245 Gibson, 23. 
246 Ibid., 9. 
247 Gibson, 9. 
54 
 
in 1851, caused some disturbance to the site.248 In the spring of 1913, gravel-mining 
operations again intruded into the burial ground. Charles Read Carr, a local resident and 
librarian at the George Hail Free Library in Warren, undertook the first and only 
systematic archaeological excavations ever conducted at the site.249 Carr wanted to 
assemble materials for an ethnological exhibit at the library, but he kept records of the 
excavation process.250 He recruited friends and other laymen to dig. Human remains were 
discovered along with wampum and stone tools, and Carr surmised the site was a 
Wampanoag burial ground.251 Carr attempted to preserve a piece of Indian history; he 
excavated so artifacts could be recovered before full damage was done. But Carr wasn’t 
entirely sensitive or careful in his work.252 According to the RIHPHC publication Native 
American Archaeology in Rhode Island “the matter-of-fact, casual attitude toward both 
the unintentional (mining) and intentional (Carr’s attempts at archaeology) removal of 
burials contrasts with the preference of many people today to leave graves 
undisturbed.”253  
 On August 15, 1913, Carr procured an agreement from the New York, New 
Haven, and Hartford Railroad, which owned the Burr's Hill tract. The agreement 
stipulated that any artifacts found there would become the property of the George Hail 
Free Library.254 At the time of publication, Gibson wrote that the Burr's Hill collection 
was divided principally between the George Hail Free Library in Warren, the 
Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology in Bristol, and the Museum of the American 
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Indian Heye Foundation in New York. Some items were also scattered among museums 
and private collections.255 In May 2017, the Wampanoag Tribe reclaimed the Burr's Hill 
artifacts from the Heffenreffer Museum and George Hail Free Library and reinterred 
them at Burr's Hill, according to a personal conversation with Patricia Redfearn, director 
of the George Hail Free Library. 
 For many of the 42 burials unearthed at Burr's Hill in the spring and summer of 
1913, the bones had almost entirely disintegrated, but in some they were preserved well 
enough that grave placement attributes could be discerned.256 Most of the individuals had 
been buried in the typical manner of the Native Americans of southern New England of 
the Late Woodland and Early Historic periods: with the body flexed and knees drawn to 
the chest.257 Many individuals had been wrapped in matting, blankets or bark boards.258 A 
number of graves contained traces of powdered red ocher pigment, an important element 
of mortuary ceremonialism over much of eastern North America from Late Archaic times 
to the historic period.259  
 At least two individuals at Burr's Hill were buried in the European style, with legs 
extended. There were no extended burials at the comparable Native American West Ferry 
site in Jamestown, Rhode Island (c. 1610-1660). Nor were there extended burials at RI 
1000, the site of a Narragansett cemetery in North Kingstown (c. 1650-1670s).260 But at 
the slightly later (c. 1660-1730) Pantiago site in East Hampton, Long Island, nearly half 
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of the recorded burials (17 of 38) were extended.261 This shift in body orientation for the 
dead reflects an adoption of European customs and Christian religion. Native Americans 
still incorporated elements of their aboriginal culture, though. At Burr’s Hill, those who 
were buried with extended legs faced the same direction as the flexed dead, generally, 
with heads in a southerly direction. Gibson argues: “rather than signaling the rejection of 
native burial customs, the extended body posture seems to have been incorporated into 
the traditional mortuary complex, in much the same manner that European trade wares 
were.”262 The high number of multiple interments- at least 10 out of 42 at Burr's Hill- 
compared to one each at the West Ferry and Pantiago sites (sites of comparable size) may 
be attributable to a smallpox epidemic, especially coupled with the evidence of postules 
recorded on one preserved skull.263  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
261 Gibson, 13. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
57 
 
Firearm and firearm-related artifact inventory of Burr’s Hill.264 
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Firearm and firearm-related inventory of Burr’s Hill.265 
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In his analysis of Burr’s Hill firearms, Jean-Francois Blanchette dates the Burr's 
Hill flintlock to the mid-seventeenth century; the blade gunflints (of which there are eight 
in the Burr's Hill collection) were first produced in the mid-seventeenth century.266 Not 
all burial offerings are dated to this period, however. The earliest European trade objects 
in the Burr's Hill collection date to the early seventeenth century, or possibly the late 
sixteenth century. Blanchette dates the matchlock to the end of the sixteenth century or 
beginning of the seventeenth.267 Since the great bulk of the collection dates from the mid-
century or later, it is perhaps more plausible to suppose that these earlier objects are items 
which had been in use some time before being interred or heirlooms passed down from a 
previous generation.268 Nonetheless, Gibson posits: 
The manufacturing dates of the surviving objects from Burr's 
Hill suggest that most of the burials were made during King 
Philip's sachemship, probably during the quarter century or less 
preceding King Philip's War (1675/6) and possibly during the 
war. The location of the cemetery south of the original Warren 
boundary may well be more than a coincidence, for while 
Warren was settled by Englishmen as early as 1667, Bristol 
was reserved for the Wampanoag until 1680.269 
 
The only purely aboriginal materials from the graves excavated in 1913 were four stone 
pestles, one clay pot, one wooden spoon fragment, a bone implement, one arrowhead and 
numerous matting fragments.270 Although the majority of the objects found in the graves 
at Burr's Hill were either European imports or made with European tools or materials, the 
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tasks they were put to and their forms more closely conformed to Wampanoag than to 
European cultural patterns.271 In some cases, imported goods simply replaced 
functionally similar items in the aboriginal material culture. For example, steel hoes, axes 
and knives substituted for shell, wood, bone or stone tools.272  
 Gibson argues the abundance of materials at Burr's Hill is its most striking 
feature.273 The Burr's Hill site is slightly smaller than the West Ferry site in terms of total 
number of interments, and it's comparable to the Pantiago site on Long Island, but Burr's 
Hill exceeded both in sheer quantity of grave goods.274 The material collection is now 
fragmented (some materials were reinterred and some are in personal collections) so it is 
difficult to compare absolute numbers of artifacts from the three sites, but Gibson posits 
Burr's Hill yielded nearly three times as many objects as West Ferry and more than four 
times as many as Pantiago.275  
 Carr recorded that 36 of the 42 interments contained some burial offerings.276 
Why was the Burr's Hill site comparatively rich? It may be due to the strategic position 
occupied by this group of Wampanoag; it was a location within the vicinity of Philip's 
headquarters at Mount Hope. Gibson posits: “living in or near the principal village of the 
chief sachem, the Wampanoag group which utilized the Burr's Hill cemetery undoubtedly 
would have had greater access to European trade wares than would peripherally situated 
groups.”277 Greater accessibility may bias the study of this particular cemetery; a 
cemetery will naturally yield more grave goods if those goods were more plentiful for the 
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people in life. There the significance is attached not only to the quantity of material 
remains but also to the very act of interring goods with the dead. Seventeenth century 
chroniclers reported that grave goods were placed in the graves of the aboriginal people 
of New England to meet the needs of the dead in the afterlife.278  
Jean-Francois Blanchette notes that the Wampanoag were selective in their 
adoption of European guns; they favored the flintlock over the matchlock, and “this 
selectivity in the choice of firearms should be reflected in the archaeological record.”279 
Thus, matchlocks and wheellocks should be absent from aboriginal sites and flintlocks 
should be found in sites dated after 1630 or 1640.280 Particularly noteworthy, though, is 
that a matchlock plate with serpentine was recovered from the Burr's Hill site. Blanchette 
argues that this does not necessarily contradict the generalization that matchlocks were 
not widely used by the native inhabitants of North America, “for it must be understood 
that artifacts found in burial sites are offerings to the dead and do not necessarily 
represent objects actually used by living Indians.”281 In fact, burial sites often contain 
broken tools or utensils, special artifacts to be used strictly by the deceased and/or surplus 
materials.282 The matchlock from Burr's Hill may have been a broken and useless object 
that was deemed suitable for burial; the serpentine was set facing away from the plate and 
was therefore useless.283  
 The European firearms and related artifacts recovered from Burr's Hill included: 
one matchlock, one possible doglock plate, one lockplate from an unknown firing 
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mechanism, one pistol barrel, one gun barrel, parts of another gun barrel, eight gunflints, 
two lead shot molds and numerous lead shot.284 To ignite a flintlock, gunflints were 
necessary. Held between the jaws of the cock, the pulling of the trigger projected the flint 
against a steel plate known as the battery; the impact of the flint against the steel was so 
great that it caused particles from the steel plate to become detached, ignite, and fall into 
the pan which contained the powder.285 There are bifacial gunflints and spall gunflints; 
bifacial gunflints achieve their form thanks to a percussion chipping manufacture.286 
Spall gunflint was made from a flake that detached from a pebble and was rounded off by 
small re-touches on the thickest sides.287 When ready-made gunflints couldn't be 
obtained, Native Americans made their own. Bifacial gunflints were not recovered from 
the Burr's Hill site.288 In seventeenth century North American sites, the majority of 
gunflints recovered are usually of the spall type.289 The Burr's Hill collection contains 
one spall gunflint held in the jaws of a cock.290 Blanchette notes that “their rarity in the 
Burr's Hill collection is difficult to explain. It is possible that the Wampanoag needed 
gunflints so badly during that period that they could not afford to bury them with their 
dead.”291 Whether the objects were broken and useless in life or the materials were too 
precious to bury due to their limited quantities, the burial of European goods with Native 
American people demonstrates an interweaving of cultures and the Native American 
tendency to attribute some value and prestige to European firearms. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RECONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK 
Primary Source Evidence 
 Benjamin Church, a prominent English military figure, was commissioned to find 
Philip as the war waned, and he recruited Sakonnet allies. With their help, Church's 
company breached the hitherto impenetrable swamps of New England.292 Church was not 
the first to employ Native American allies against the enemy; Connecticut forces had 
relied on the Mohegans, Pequots and Niantics since the beginning of the war.293  
 Church's Sakonnet allies versed him in wilderness warfare. The Sakonnets 
insisted that silence was essential when in pursuit of the enemy; the English had a 
tendency for leather shoes, thick pants and conversation, which contributed to their 
frequent discoveries by the Native Americans, who were silent and deft in the New 
England forests.294 Philbrick suggests that “perhaps the most important lesson Church 
learned from the Sakonnets was never to leave a swamp the same way he had entered it. 
To do otherwise was to walk into an ambush.”295  
In The History of King Philip's War by Benjamin Church, he details the Native 
American-style war tactics he used during the attack on Philip and his followers on 
August 12, 1676.While tracking Philip, Church and his colonial soldiers and Native 
American allies used the method of secret and sudden attacks to take “great Numbers of 
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them Prisoners.”296 Church is flexing in his telling of his military maneuvers and 
heroism, but he evidences the influence of aboriginal warfare and strategies through his 
narrative. 
 Church wrote that he “always Marched at a wide distance one from another, 
partly for their safety: and this was an Indian custom, to March thin and scatter.”297 
Church also learned: 
That the Indians gain'd great advantage of the English by two things; The Indians 
always took care in their Marches and Fights, not to come too thick together. But the 
English always kept in a heap together, that it was as easy to hit them as to hit an 
House. The other was, that if at any time they discovered a company of English 
Souldiers in the Woods, they knew that there was all, for the English never scattered; 
but the Indians always divided and scattered.298  
  
In his pursuit of Philip, Church positioned himself at one end of a swamp where 
the Wampanoag sachem took refuge, and ordered his men to distribute themselves 
around the perimeter; he was met with “a great number of the Enemy, well armed, 
coming out of the Swamp. But on fight of the English they seemed very much surprised 
and tack'd short.”299 Though the Native American enemy was well-armed, they were 
surprised and thus disadvantaged. Church then threatened an overwhelming attack by his 
hidden soldiers if the enemy fired a shot. Church wrote: “They seeing both Indians and 
English come so thick upon them, were so surprised that many of them stood still and let 
the English come and take the Guns out of their hands, when they were both charged and 
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cock'd.”300 The element of surprise was an extremely potent and effective tool; even 
when the two sides were matched in terms of weaponry. If one group was caught off 
guard, it rendered their weapons less effective because they were overpowered and 
limited in their actions due to the military tactic of surprise and ambush executed by the 
enemy. 
 Philip eluded capture in that initial forest confrontation, and the colonial army 
retired to rest for a few days; Church then received information that Philip had made 
camp at Mount Hope; according to an informant, Philip was “in the south end of the 
miery swamp just at the foot of the Mount.”301 Early on the morning of August 12, after a 
few days in pursuit, Church and his company finally approached Philip's camp. Like he 
did previously in a forest combat situation, Church stationed his company, made up of no 
more than 24 men, around the periphery of the swamp where Philip and his men had 
made camp.302  
Church's company crawled on their bellies as they approached Philip's camp, and: 
Capt. Church knowing it was Philips custom to be fore-most in the flight, went 
down to the Swamp and gave Capt. Williams of Situate the command of the right 
wing of the Ambush, and placed an English-man and an Indian to-gether behind 
such shelters of Trees, &c. that he could find, and took care to place them at such 
distance as none might pass undiscovered between them...303 
In the eastern portion of the swamp, two of Church's men met Philip as he attempted an 
escape. According to Church, Philip attempted to escape and ran towards two of Church's 
men waiting in ambush. Though the Englishman's musket misfired, a Pocasset ally 
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named Alderman shot and killed Philip as he ran.304 The waiting men: “let him come fair 
within shot, and the English mans Gun missing fire, he bid the Indian fire away, and he 
did so to purpose, sent one musket bullet thro’ his heart, and another two inches from it; 
he fell upon his face in the mud and water with his gun under him.”305 Church’s account 
shouldn’t be misconstrued as a flawless narrative of the war; it comes with its own set of 
biases. Church’s account, also, shouldn’t be considered a precise re-telling of the final 
and fatal attack on Philip. It evidences Church’s use of aboriginal military tactics but in 
terms of physical re-creating the attack, it’s not precise.306  
Archaeological Evidence: RI 5 
 On Brown University Mount Hope property is a monument commemorating the 
approximate location of King Philip’s death. The monument reads: “In the ‘Miery 
Swamp’ 165 feet W.S.W. from this spring, according to tradition, King Philip fell, 
August 12, 1676, U.S. This stone placed by the R.I. Historical Society December, 1877.” 
Kevin Smith, deputy director and chief curator at the Haffenreffer Museum of 
Anthropology at Brown University, said the site (RI 5) is not actually the site of Philip’s 
assassination but merely the site where a monument was placed in the nineteenth century 
to commemorate his death.307  
                                                           
304 Ibid., 336-7. 
305 Ibid., 44. 
306 Kevin Smith, deputy director and chief curator, Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology, Brown 
University, e-mail message to author, Nov. 20, 2018. 
307 Ibid. 
67 
 
 
Plaque at RI 5. Photo by author, August, 2018. 
 
 The Rhode Island Historical Preservation & Heritage Commission was 
established in 1968 by an act of the General Assembly to develop a statewide 
preservation program under the umbrella of the United States Department of the 
Interior’s National Park Service. The RIHPHC is charged with many responsibilities, 
including the conduction of state-wide surveys of historic properties, recommending 
places for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places and regulating 
archaeological exploration on state lands.308 RI 5 is one such site; the earliest record of RI 
5 in the RIHPHC archives dates to August, 21, 1975. The site was surveyed that year, 
according to the state archive for the site. Many of the entries into the state archaeological 
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site files in the early years of RIHPHC contain sites already known by researchers to 
exist; several located on Brown University’s Mount Hope property were reported to the 
RIHPHC in the 1970s. The site where Philip allegedly died, known as the “Cold Spring 
Site,” was among them.309 In fact, many of the first few hundred entries in the state’s site 
files, housed at the RIHPHC, are previously recorded sites from nonprofessionals, strings 
of new sites from academics or cultural resource management surveys, or previously 
recorded sites from the Haffenreffer Museum or the Rhode Island Historical Society 
recollections or records.310 RI 5 lies on Brown University property and is located ¼ of a 
mile off the museum access road to the right; the 1975 site file mentions a locked gate 
and fence, but in August 2018 there was no locked gate at the threshold of the forest path 
to reach the monument. On site, near the monument, is a stone structure, used by Indians 
in the 1970s for commemorative celebrations.311  
 Smith, an archaeologist, conducted a non-invasive metal detector survey on 
portions of Brown’s property in 2003-2004. He was searching for concentrations of 
metals that could help identify old cabin sites or areas of formal dumping.312 A concern 
then was that Mouth Hope was a major village site from the time of King Philip’s War.313 
There was no recovery of materials from locations where archaeologists discovered sub-
surface metal.314 It was difficult for the archaeologists to identify any real concentrations 
since 350 years of Euro-American farming and occupation on the property had resulted in 
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a continuous scatter of garbage across the landscape.315 But, the area around the spring 
did have a relatively large concentration of metal “hits,” which hinted to the possibility of 
a Contact Period occupation. To test the possibility, archaeologists put in three 1x1 meter 
test units (two on the terrace above the spring and one in an area of very high-density 
“hits” in the low-lying swampy area to the side of the spring). The terrace test units 
demonstrated the metal “hits” there were from nails associated with nineteenth century 
glass and ceramics; at considerably greater depth in one of the test units, archaeologists 
found quartz debitage in sandy deposits, suggesting limited prehistoric occupation or 
activity near the spring. Nothing implied occupation or activity there in the seventeenth 
century. The test unit in the swampy area to the side of the spring’s outlet had even more 
nails and a significant concentration of late nineteenth-century wine glass fragments and 
eating vessels.316 There was nothing there to indicate prehistoric or contact period activity 
but archaeologists were not able to excavate deeply as the unit flooded.317 In the units 
excavated, there was no evidence to indicate any activity around the spring during the 
time of King Philip’s War. The surface layers of the three units opened were consistent 
with partying and picnicking around the site of the Historical Society’s monument ca. 
1870s-1890s.318 Smith suspects the nails on the terrace reflect the location of structures or 
shelters for picnics while the concentration of glass and ceramics in the swamp area was 
a picnic dump.319 Archaeologists saw limited suggestions of much earlier reduction of 
quartz linked to prehistoric quarrying of the white quartz seams on Mount Hope; its 
depth, though, seemed inconsistent with anything as recent as the seventeenth century, 
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and given the access that the Wampanoag had to European metal tools by the time of 
King Philip’s War, it seems unlikely that this work with local quartz would date to the 
seventeenth century.320 With early, buried evidence of prehistoric and historic activity, RI 
5 is more than the site of a monument. But Smith wrote that nothing suggests or confirms 
the location of a battle site. There are several sites of archaeological and historical 
interest on Brown’s property, according to Smith, including two on the western side of 
the property that he dated to the sixteenth- seventeenth century and one on the northeast 
edge of the property that produced a Late Woodland Levanna point made from Attleboro 
Red Felsite. There are memories, too, of an Archaic site (5,000 to 3,000 years old) that 
was washed away in a hurricane in the 1950s.321 All of these sites document Native 
American presence and activity on the Brown University Mount Hope property, but they 
do not suggest or confirm a contact period village or battle sites on the property. Aside 
from Smith’s work from 2003 to 2010, there were other surveys and some digging done 
in the 1950s and 1970s, but no inquires revealed any information to support a village or 
battle site on the Mount Hope property.322 With no archaeological evidence to confirm RI 
5 as the site where King Philip fell, the exact location can continued to be guessed and 
chased but may forever remain a mystery.323  
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The Archaeology of War 
Dr. Kevin McBride et al. conducted a battlefield archaeology survey of the 
Nipsachuck Battlefield and Nipsachuck Ceremonial Area in North Smithfield, Rhode 
Island (a site approximately 30 miles away from RI 5 in Bristol) and published the results 
in a technical report in 2013. Known as the Second Battle of Nipsachuck, the attack took 
place early in July, 1676; a force of 300 Connecticut dragoons and 100 Pequot and 
Mohegan conducted a successful surprise attack on a Narragansett camp of at least 170 
people. 125 Narragansett were killed in the attack.324 Approximately 150 battle-related 
and domestic objects within the 67-acre battlefield were identified. The researchers 
reasoned that the nature and distribution of the battle-related artifacts would reveal the 
avenues of attacks by the colonists and their allies.325 If battle-related objects were 
recovered from RI 5, it might be possible for researchers to trace the battle, like McBride 
et al. did. Since no such objects have been recovered there yet, researchers must heavily 
rely on colonial sources, which aren’t entirely accurate in regards to battle re-structuring. 
McBride et al. conducted the battlefield analysis on the Second Battle of Nipsachuck, in 
part, to “understand how the weapons and tactics of the various combatants influenced 
the battles.”326 A battlefield analysis of RI5 that yielded physical evidence would have 
been invaluable to this research. The lack of archaeological evidence at the site of King 
Philip’s death (wherever it may be) results in an understanding of the past that, though 
still valid, is less complete. McBride et al. provide a rich and nuanced analysis of the 
Second Battle of Nipsachuck by adding archaeological evidence. Their battlefield 
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analysis relied heavily on the nature and distribution of round lead shot (or musket balls) 
across the battlefield.327 At the Mattity Swamp battlefield the direction of fire could be 
determined for nineteen of the musket balls; direction of fire is a “very significant factor 
in reconstructing the nature, movement, and progress of a battle.”328 No such artifacts 
were recovered at RI 5 in the years of various surveys and test pits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
327 Ibid., 101. 
328 Ibid., 109. 
73 
 
CHAPTER 6 
MEMORY 
 Lepore argues that how wars are remembered can be just as important as how 
they were fought and first described.329 War generates acts of narration, and this narration 
can take the form of oral traditions or written traditions. Both war and the words used to 
describe it serve to define the geographical, political, cultural, racial and/or national 
boundaries between people.330 Memory, then, is especially important to people who 
didn’t have written traditions. DeLucia writes: “Memory has its own logic and faculties 
for recalling, forgetting, or silencing the past, and it merits serious consideration as a 
form of historical knowledge, particularly among communities that have valued 
nonwritten strategies for transmitting the past to posterity.”331 Though memory and the 
disclosure and dissemination of that memory via oral tradition is a valid version of 
history for the Native Americans of New England, their extermination and dislocation at 
the close of King Philip's War affected how their version of the war is remembered today.  
 In the century that followed King Philip's War, colonists erected few permanent 
monuments. DeLucia argues that this hesitance stemmed from Protestant wariness about 
graven images and also financial depletion after the war, “and it resulted in a principally 
invisible commemorative landscape in which settler verbal accounts animated key 
points.”332  DeLucia argues that Rhode Islanders created a “memoryscape” that 
recollected their area's engagements with Narragansetts and Wampanoags, and Zachariah 
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Allen (1795-1882) exemplified these tendencies.333 Born in Providence and educated at 
Brown University, Allen built his fortune through textile enterprises, yet he remained a 
devoted champion and advocate for the past. The Rhode Island Historical Society was 
founded in 1822, and Allen became president of the organization. Allen “was a tireless 
speaker and writer on historical topics, organized group outings to notable sites, and was 
a principal architect of public memory during the state's colonial revival.”334 The colonial 
revival was a late nineteenth-century movement that encouraged interest in America's 
colonial heritage, especially on the East Coast; it tended to foster a sanitized view of the 
past “that seemed reassuring and morally sound in an era of rapid social 
transformation.”335 Allen paid homage to the grave site of Benjamin Church in Little 
Compton and personally funded renovations for the crumbling grave stone. The 
grassroots efforts in the centuries proceeding the end of King Philip's War and before the 
twentieth century to memorialize the New England landscape contrasts with more 
concerted efforts by historical societies and, more notably, Native American tribes in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The lag in the erection of Native American-
sponsored monuments speaks to their struggle to regain lost territory and power since 
colonization.  
DeLucia argues that land is a “potent vector of memory production” and she takes 
a place-based approach to “restore a dimension of cultural practice typically unseen and 
unheard.”336 She notes that locals and travelers in South County, Rhode Island, gravitate 
to the “Great Swamp Fight” monument in South Kingstown, which memorializes the 
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massacre of Narragansetts that took place in South County, Rhode Island on December 
19, 1675. Colonial militia shot or burned to death hundreds of Narragansetts and 
Wampanoag refugees.337  
Great Swamp Monument, South Kingstown, Rhode Island. February, 
2018. Photo by author. 
 
 The road that leads to the monument is called Great Swamp Monument Road, off 
of Route 2 in South Kingstown. The monument's plaques are broken and some of the 
stone inscriptions are dull. According to one plaque, the monument was erected by the 
Rhode Island Society of Colonial Wars in 1908. The plaque reads: “Attacked within their 
fort upon this island the Narragansett Indians made their last stand in King Philip's War 
and were crushed by the united forces of the Massachusetts Connecticut and Plymouth 
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Colonies in the ‘Great Swamp Fight’ Sunday 19 December 1675.” With such an 
inscription, the monument acts less like a somber and sympathetic ode to the massacred 
Narragansett and Wampanoag people. The plaque's language calls attention to the victors 
and touts their military prowess in “crushing” the ambushed Narragansetts and 
Wampanoags. If the Native Americans emerged from King Philip's War victorious, the 
language on the plaque would be different.  
 The “Great Swamp Fight” monument is one example of a physical structure in 
New England that was facilitated by non-native groups. A marker at Burr's Hill park in 
Warren, though, was facilitated by Wampanoag people in May 2017; a group from 
Martha's Vineyard, specifically.338 The marker reads: “While memories of this land spark 
the fires of his spirit, let the smoke rise in prayerful respect to Wampanoag Massasoit 
'8SÂMEEQAN' Yellow Feather Esteemed Leader of the Wampanoag Nation his vision 
and 1621 treaty upheld fifty-four years of peace with early English settlers.” Along with 
the installation of the marker, the Wampanoags also reinterred the artifacts recovered 
from previous excavations in the early twenty-first century, which were previously under 
the ownership of various libraries and museums, including the Heffenreffer Museum and 
George Hail Free Library.339 The marker's language does not mention the reinterment of 
the artifacts, nor is there any physical indication where exactly in the park they are 
buried. This may be to protect from looters and it could also stem from a desire to respect 
the dead. Writing in 1935, Princess Red Wing, Narragansett tribal historian, notes the 
tendency of Native Americans in New England to refrain from or minimize a narration of 
death: “New England Indians believed death to be the 'great mystery' and did not 
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speculate upon it or explain it to their young.”340 Lepore notes that changing names was 
not uncommon for the Native American tribes of New England, and uttering the name of 
a dead person was considered a grievous wrongdoing.341 In 1665, Philip himself traveled 
to Nantucket to kill a Native American who had spoken the name of his dead father, 
Massasoit.342  
Burr’s Hill. Marker commissioned by the Wampanoag 
Tribe. Leaning against it is a library loan of Macmillan 
Encyclopedia of Native American Tribes by Michael 
Johnson; other small tokens like orange feathers and an 
American flag are nearby. February, 2018. Photo by 
author. 
 The language of the marker honors Massasoit, the leader of the Wampanoag 
people before his son, Philip, took control. It refers to the “memories of the land,” or the 
scars the war left behind. Though they cannot be forgotten, the language of the marker 
notes that peace existed before the carnage, and Massasoit's successful treaty guaranteed 
those fifty-four years of peace. The “Great Swamp Fight” monument was erected in the 
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early twentieth century by a non-Native American group and touts colonial heroics, 
victory and utter defeat of an unsuspecting group of Narragansetts and Wampanoags. The 
Burr's Hill marker was erected about 100 years later by a group of Wampanoag people 
and recognizes a Wampanoag leader that kept the peace with European for years, before 
tensions came to a head with King Philip's War. The stark differences between the war 
monuments reveal what certain communities choose to memorialize. Lepore is 
recognized as the authority on written memory and landscape memory as it pertains to 
King Philip’s War. For some communities, wartime glory and victory are 
commemorated. For others, it is the calm before the storm that is memorialized in the 
landscape, a time before a culture was almost completely exterminated. Winners tout 
what they win, and the defeated mourn what they lost. These feelings manifest in 
monuments like the “Great Swamp Fight” monument and the Burr's Hill marker that dot 
the New England landscape today.  
 Many remnants of King Philip’s War in Bristol, Rhode Island today coalesce in 
the form of street names and modern establishments. Metacom Avenue is a major artery 
in the town; King Philip Motors is the name of an auto repair shop on Metacom Avenue. 
Some remnants are subtle, while others are overt.343 A statue in Independence Park 
depicts a replica of Christopher Columbus’s flagship. A plaque on the statue reads: “In 
recognition of Bristol’s cultural diversity and commemoration of the Columbus 
quincentennial/The Bristol, Rhode Island Heritage and Discovery Committee/October 12, 
1992.” A statue that claims to honor the cultural diversity of Bristol omits any sign of 
Native American influence in that diversity; there are no Native American images on the 
statue, there is only the colonial ship. It’s also interesting that Columbus’s voyage is 
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honored over the seventeenth century English inhabitation of Bristol; the colonization of 
Rhode Island then and the outbreak of King Philip’s War more directly affected Bristol’s 
cultural diversity than did Columbus’s voyage in the fifteenth century. But the Bristol, 
Rhode Island Heritage and Discovery Committee may have chosen to commemorate 
Columbus’s voyage over the New England pilgrims precisely because it is farther 
removed and less personal. The plaque’s mention of cultural diversity is perhaps a noble 
attempt at commemorating the Native Americans who lost their lives, but it’s still too 
subtle and sterile to be a fair and true honor of the aboriginal inhabitants. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Almost 400 years removed, it’s easy to detach ourselves emotionally from the 
people who experienced the war. The man referred to today in scholarly journals and 
books today is known as Philip, but he wasn’t actually Philip at all; he was called 
something else by his people. The Wampanoag sachem had a family and a life, and it was 
interrupted by outside forces that eventually killed him. Those forces also killed almost 
everyone he knew and took ownership of his land. Such wounds are too deep to fix with 
state names, park names and statues. The acknowledgements and honors help, but they 
don’t erase the past and the future it shaped. It’s hard not to dwell on it. To think how 
things could have been if only people then made different choices.  
Charles Hughes, a Korean War veteran, writes: “While we do not experience the 
manifold buzzing confusion of life as a story, we do require the ordering and sequencing 
of events for understanding; we need narrative to make sense of our experiences.”344 To 
make sense of the natural world and cultural events, people use language- a tool that 
creates borders and categories in life. Sometimes language fails to express feelings 
adequately, especially the pain and violence of war. Jill Lepore argues that when people 
cannot name their suffering: “reality itself becomes confused, even unreal. But we do not 
remain at a loss for words for long. Out of the chaos we soon make new meanings of our 
world, finding words to make reality real again.”345 For people, language can be 
expressed verbally or with the written word. Written narrative is held in high esteem 
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perhaps because it makes tangible something that is not. It also lasts longer than its 
creator, and so it serves as a piece of the person who created it and left it behind. Writing 
doesn't die.The English colonists reflected, argued, and memorialized with written 
narration. As Lepore has extensively researched, more than 400 letters dated from June 
1675 to August 1676 survive in New England archives alone; there are more than 30 
editions of 20 different printed accounts. The Native Americans who were defeated in 
King Philip's War did not document their experiences on paper, they spoke them.346 
 There were a number of factors which led to the colonial victory in King Philip's 
War, but the adoption of Native American war tactics was more influential than a 
discrepancy in weapons. The colonists and the Native Americans were pretty even-
handed when it came to their military hardware. The Native Americans already had a 
sufficient arsenal before the Europeans arrived in the New World, and they were skilled 
in mitigating the shortcomings of their aboriginal weapons. Quickly, too, the Native 
Americans adopted European guns and supplemented their weapon caches. The colonists 
were the victors in King Philip's War, though, because they adopted military tactics that 
were suitable for the New England wilderness. This coupled with the English tendency 
for total warfare and the lifeline to England for provisions guaranteed that the colonists 
would use the tactics ruthlessly and without limitation and thus secure the war victory. 
Rhode Island monuments reveal the intricacies of war and memory for the communities 
that were involved. King Philip's War left scars that are still felt by some and seen by 
many today. 
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